Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts by Sisk, Gregory C. & Heise, Michael
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
11-1-2012
Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11:
Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts
Gregory C. Sisk
University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), gcsisk@stthomas.edu
Michael Heise
Cornell Law School, michael.heise@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sisk, Gregory C. and Heise, Michael, "Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts"
(2012). Cornell Law Faculty Publications. Paper 430.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/430
A5 - SISKHEISE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2012 12:13 PM 
 
231 
Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era 
of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the 
Federal Courts 
Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise 
 In our continuing empirical study of religious-liberty decisions in the 
federal courts, American Muslims were at a distinct and substantial 
disadvantage in raising free exercise or accommodation claims between 
1996 and 2005. With other variables held constant, the likelihood of 
success for non-Muslim claimants in Religious Free Exercise claims was 
38%, while the probability of success for Muslim claimants fell to 22% 
(with an even higher disparity among court of appeals judges). In sum, 
Muslim claimants enjoyed only about half the chance to receive 
accommodation of their religious beliefs and practices as did claimants from 
other religious communities. 
 Drawing on insights from legal studies, political science, and social and 
cognitive psychology, we discuss alternative explanations for this result, 
including: (1) a cultural antipathy toward Islam as another minority 
religion outside the modern American religious triumvirate of Protestantism, 
Catholicism, and Judaism; (2) the growing secularism in certain sectors of 
society along with opposition to groups holding traditional religious values; 
(3) the possibility that claims made by Muslims are weaker and deserve to be 
rejected on the merits; and (4) the fears harbored by many Americans that 
followers of Islam pose a security danger to the United States, especially in 
an era of terrorist anxiety. As a new threat to religious liberty, the persistent 
uneasiness of many Americans about Islam and its followers appears to 
have filtered into the attitudes of such well-educated and independent elites 
as federal judges. 
 
  Laghi Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law 
(Minnesota) (gcsisk@stthomas.edu). For comments on an earlier draft, we thank Hadar 
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Pounds, Michael Paulsen, Lena Salaymeh, David Schwartz, Dawinder Sidhu, Kristen Stilt, 
Ahmed Taha, Robert Vischer, and the participants and attendees at panels at the Conference 
on Empirical Legal Studies at Northwestern University on November 5, 2011, the Twin Cities 
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Professor Sisk thanks his assistant, Bethany Fletcher, for work inputting coding and law 
students, Eric Beecher and Alicia Long, for conducting cross-checks on opinion coding. 
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The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside 
in their course, and pass the judges by. 
 —Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Following an Islamic legal ruling by local Muslim leaders, Somali 
immigrant taxi drivers in the Twin Cities refused to transport passengers 
who were openly carrying alcoholic beverages, believing that doing so would 
violate the Qur’an’s ban on intoxicants.2 Many travelers arriving at the 
Minneapolis–St. Paul International Airport, who were toting transparent 
bags containing bottles of wine or carrying boxes of liquor were turned away 
by the first driver waiting in the taxi line (if he were a Muslim) and instead 
directed to another taxi driver (who was not).3 Upset at being declined 
service by a taxi driver, travelers lodged complaints with the airport 
administration.4 
Wanting to ensure that all arriving travelers would find convenient 
ground transportation while also accommodating the beliefs of the Somali 
Muslim taxi drivers, the Metropolitan Airports Commission came up with 
what both airport officials and Somali taxi drivers thought was an “ingenious 
solution.”5 Those taxi drivers who, by reason of religious stricture, could not 
transport alcoholic beverages would install a light on top of their cabs so 
that the dispatcher could instead signal a different taxi driver to come 
forward for passengers openly carrying liquor.6 In this way, most persons 
seeking a taxi at the airport would be served promptly and likely not even 
 
 1. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921). 
 2. Keith Oppenheim, If You Drink, Some Cabbies Won’t Drive, CNN.COM (Jan. 26, 2007), 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/01/25/oppenheim.cabbies/index.html; see also QUR’AN, Surah 
Al-Ma’idah 5:90 (prohibiting intoxicants). 
 3. See David Van Biema, Religion: Minnesota’s Teetotal Taxis, TIME (Jan. 19, 2007), http:// 
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580390,00.html. These Somali immigrant taxi 
drivers do not have any religious duty to inquire of passengers about alcoholic beverages or to 
investigate whether closed baggage contained liquor. See Dolal v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, No. 
A07-1657, 2008 WL 4133517, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2008) (reporting affidavit of 
Muslim religious leader that taxi drivers are prohibited from searching passenger baggage and 
are only precluded from transporting a passenger when the driver knows he is carrying 
alcohol). Thus, only when a potential passenger was carrying an alcoholic beverage in view of 
the driver, such as in a bag that did not hide its contents or in a labeled liquor box, did the 
driver then believe that to accept the passenger would be to knowingly participate in the 
transportation of intoxicating substances. 
 4. Oppenheim, supra note 2. 
 5. Van Biema, supra note 3. 
 6. Id. 
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notice that they were being picked up by one taxi driver rather than 
another. 
Notwithstanding this carefully crafted compromise, and without 
substantial evidence that implementing this accommodation for Muslim taxi 
drivers would disrupt ground transportation or significantly inconvenience 
passengers, the Metropolitan Airports Commission suddenly revoked its 
support for the proposal. The reason for the abrupt reversal was, in the 
words of the commission spokesman, a “public backlash” in the form of 
emails and telephone calls opposing the policy.7 The spokesman said that 
“the feedback we got, not only locally but really from around the country 
and around the world, was almost entirely negative. . . . People saw that as 
condoning discrimination against people who had alcohol.”8 
Newspaper editorialists had urged the public to register protests with 
the commission. Some decried the accommodation policy as an “insidious” 
imposition of “the Shari’a, or Islamic law, with state sanction.”9 Others raised 
fears of a slippery slope that would lead to further accommodations for 
Muslims, warning that “down the road could lie a legally sanctioned 
religious separatism that is incompatible with America’s unifying civic 
vision.”10 One comment on an online bulletin board simply told the Muslim 
cabbies to “GET OVER IT, you are in America[,] act like an American!”11 
In the end, a governmental body overturned an apparently well-
balanced and effectively operating accommodation for a particular sincerely 
held religious belief of a minority based, not on any showing of concrete and 
substantial harm, but on the vehement opposition of vocal objectors. 
Indeed, after changing course, the commission took a progressively harsher 
stance against the Muslim taxi drivers. Previously, the commission had 
simply directed that taxi drivers who refused a fare would be required to go 
to the back of the line, which could mean waiting hours for the next 
potential passenger.12 Subsequently, the commission adopted a new policy 
imposing a thirty-day suspension of a driver’s airport license for a first-time 
refusal of a fare and a two-year revocation for a second offense,13 effectively 
forcing these Muslim taxi drivers to choose between being faithful and 
making a living. A Minnesota imam and Islamic law scholar remarked, 
 
 7. Oren Dorell, Cabbies, Culture Clash at Minn. Airport, USA TODAY (Oct. 11, 2006), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-10-10-cabbies-culture_x.htm. 
 8. Oppenheim, supra note 2. 
 9. Daniel Pipes, Don’t Bring That Booze into My Taxi, N.Y. SUN (Oct. 10, 2006), http:// 
www.danielpipes.org/4046/dont-bring-that-booze-into-my-taxi. 
 10. Katherine Kersten, A Two-Tiered Airport Taxi System Could Lead to ‘Chapter Two,’ MINN. 
STAR TRIB. (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.startribune.com/local/11585696.html?refer=y. 
 11. Amy White, Muslim Cabbies, CENTER ON RELIGION & PROFS. (May 28, 2009), 
http://www.religionandprofessions.org/1328/muslim-cabbies-case-study. 
 12. Oppenheim, supra note 2. 
 13. MAC Approves New Penalty for Taxi Drivers Who Refuse Service, KARE 11 NEWS (Apr. 16, 
2007), http://www.kare11.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=251338. 
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“[t]his type of job helps immigrants move to the next level. Blocking that 
can cost jobs [and] can also cost immigrants and their families the American 
dream.”14 
Having lost the political battle for religious accommodation in the wake 
of the public backlash, the taxi drivers turned to the Minnesota courts, 
asserting that the Commission’s strict no-exception policy infringed their 
constitutional right to freely exercise their religion.15 Noting alternative non-
equitable and administrative remedies, as well as the possibility of a stay of 
any suspension of taxi-driving privileges, the Minnesota courts denied the 
taxi drivers’ request for an injunction against enforcement of the 
Commission’s new rule.16 So far, at least, a judicial venue has not been 
availing. 
As part of our continuing empirical study of religious-liberty decisions,17 
we highlight in this Article the steep uphill climb faced by American 
Muslims in asserting free exercise of religion or religious accommodation 
claims in the lower federal courts between 1996 and 2005.18 We find that, 
unlike members of nearly every other religious community, Muslim 
claimants were at a distinct and substantial disadvantage.19 While Muslim 
claimants accounted for 15.6% of free exercise claimants in our study, they 
accounted for only 10.0% of successes. A regression analysis modeling the 
outcomes of the free exercise and accommodation cases reveals that the 
“Muslim” claimant variable was statistically significant in a negative direction, 
 
 14. Barbara Pinto, Muslim Cab Drivers Refuse To Transport Alcohol, and Dogs, ABC NEWS (Jan. 
26, 2007), http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2827800&page=1. 
 15. Dolal v. Metro. Airports Comm’n, No. A07-1657, 2008 WL 4133517, at *1 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Sept. 9, 2008). While the Twin Cities Muslim taxi-driver case illustrates the kinds of 
accommodations sought by persons of faith and the political responses sometimes encountered, 
it was not among those cases included in our data set for empirical analysis, both because it was 
decided by Minnesota state courts under the Minnesota Constitution (whereas our data set 
includes lower federal court decisions) and because it was decided in 2008 (whereas our data 
set includes cases from 1996–2005). 
 16. Id. at *3–4; see also Muslim Cab Drivers Lose Round in Court, MPR NEWS (Sept. 9, 2008), 
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/09/09/muslim_cabs_court. 
 17. See Michael Heise & Gregory Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical 
Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Heise 
& Sisk, Religion Before the Bench]; Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial 
Decision Making: An Empirical Perspective, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 185 (2012); Gregory C. Sisk, How 
Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases, 
76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1021 (2005); Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? 
An Empirical Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201 
(2012) [hereinafter Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions]; Gregory C. Sisk & Michael 
Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 
743 (2005) [hereinafter Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology]; Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & 
Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious 
Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004). 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. See infra Part III.B. 
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in contrast with the variables for all other categories of religious claimants 
(with the sole exception of marginal sects of black separatists). 
The magnitude of the negative effect on Muslim claimants in these 
religious-liberty cases is powerful. Holding all other variables constant, the 
predicted likelihood of success for non-Muslim claimants was approximately 
38%, while the predicted probability for success for Muslim claimants was 
approximately 22%.20 In other words, after controlling for the type of case 
(such as whether the claimant was a prisoner or raised an employment 
discrimination claim), the ideology of deciding judges, and other judge 
demographic variables such as gender, race, and professional background, 
Muslim claimants were predicted to prevail little more than half as 
frequently as claimants from other religious communities. 
Aside from a small number of black separatist sects, followers of other 
minority religions were not similarly disadvantaged in our study. Indeed, 
while the numbers were small, Buddhist and Rastafarian claims prevailed at 
a higher predicted rate than those from other religious groups. Thus, the 
results of our study cannot be readily explained by the conventional wisdom 
that members of minority religions seldom succeed in religious-liberty 
litigation.21 
Nor can we confidently attribute these results to the traditionalist 
nature of Islam—that is, viewing the results of this study through the lens of 
the larger “culture wars” within the United States.22 We found that adherents 
to other faiths that emphasize traditional moral values, such as Catholics and 
Baptists, were not subject to the same disadvantage in court for this time 
period, although a particular trend in the legal doctrine may account for 
why these other traditionalist religious believers may no longer suffer a 
similarly diminished opportunity for success.23 In any event, the types of 
cases typically brought by Muslim claimants did not present direct clashes 
between traditional values and secular regulations, which instead tend to 
arise in cases such as those involving the application of anti-discrimination 
laws to religious institutions.24 
By employing control variables, separately examining prisoner and non-
prisoner cases, and noting the typical nature of Muslim claims, we conclude 
that the poorer results for Muslim claimants uncovered by our study cannot 
be attributed to weaker religious-liberty claims on the merits.25 
We believe the most likely explanation for the impaired success for 
Muslims in religious-liberty claims lies in the lingering perception that Islam 
 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 22. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 23. See infra Part IV.B.2.c. 
 24. See infra Part IV.B.2.d. 
 25. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
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poses a risk to our nation’s security.26 The results of this study suggest that 
federal judges are not immune to the fears and suspicions often directed 
toward Muslims in American public life. These negative attitudes—harbored 
by those who see followers of Islam as posing a danger to American society—
appear to have infected the subconscious attitudes of such well-educated 
and independent elites as federal judges.27 
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RELIGIOUS FREE EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION 
DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS, 1996–2005 
A. THE RELIGIOUS FREE EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION STUDY 
1. The Nature of the Study 
In the present 1996–2005 study, we conducted an analysis of decisions 
made by judges of both the federal courts of appeals and the district courts 
in cases where plaintiffs raised constitutional or statutory religious freedom 
claims.28 For this Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation phase of the 
study, we created a data set of the universe of Westlaw digested decisions by 
the federal district courts and courts of appeals from 1996 through 2005 in 
which a religious believer or institution sought accommodation by the 
government or asserted that a government action burdened the free 
exercise of religion, inhibited religious expression, or discriminated on 
religious grounds.29 
As in our prior study,30 we defined “Religious Free 
Exercise/Accommodation” cases to include (1) claims arising directly under 
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution;31 (2) claims arising under the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment involving alleged government suppression of religious 
 
 26. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
 27. See infra Part V. 
 28. For more information about our data set, primary regression analysis results, coding of 
each decision, coding of each judge, and information about our coding methods, see Gregory 
Sisk & Michael Heise, Empirical Study of Religious Liberty Decisions, U. ST. THOMAS, 
http://courseweb.stthomas.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.html (last visited Aug. 30, 
2012). 
 29. In our prior 1986–1995 study of religious-liberty decisions, we included only 
published decisions in our data set. In so doing, we knowingly “biased our database in favor of 
decisions that raise highly visible, controversial, landmark, or difficult questions of religious freedom, 
or at least issues of religious freedom that a judicial actor found particularly interesting and thus worthy 
of publication.” Sisk, supra note 17, at 1049. For the present study, we have expanded the data set to 
include the set of unpublished but digested opinions available on Westlaw. In addition to 1290 judicial 
participations from published decisions, our data set for Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation 
decisions includes 341 judicial participations from decisions that were digested by Westlaw but not 
published in the reporter system. 
 30. For further explanation of the definition and coding of Free Exercise/Accommodation, 
see Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 53134; Sisk, supra note 17, at 103133. 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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expression;32 (3) claims based on federal statutes designed to promote the 
free exercise of religion and speech, including the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”),33 the Equal Access Act (“EAA”),34 and the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”);35 and (4) 
charges against government entities of discrimination or inequitable 
treatment of individuals or organizations based on religious conduct or 
affiliation, including constitutional equal-protection claims and statutory 
employment-discrimination claims against federal government employers. A 
substantial majority (58.5%) of the claims presented were premised, at least 
in part, directly on the Free Exercise Clause, followed by assertions of 
unequal governmental treatment (30.4%). Statutory religious-liberty claims 
were raised in 20.9% of the observations, and 26.7% involved religious-
expression claims. 
As the decisions were collected, we coded and cataloged the direction 
of each ruling,36 general factual category of the case, religious affiliation of 
both the claimant and judge, the religious demographics of the judge’s 
community, the judge’s ideology, the judge’s race and gender, and various 
background and employment variables for the judge.37 As the point of 
analysis, we examined each individual judge’s ruling in each particular case 
as a “judicial participation.”38 Each district court judge’s ruling was coded 
separately, as was each distinct vote of the multiple judges participating on 
an appellate panel. 
Our Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation data set consisted of 
1631 judicial participations (395 by district court judges and 1236 by court 
of appeals judges). In terms of raw frequencies, before multivariate 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb2000bb-4 (2006). Although 
the Supreme Court invalidated RFRA as applied to state and local governments on the grounds 
that Congress exceeded its congressional powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the statute continues to apply to the federal 
government. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 
(2006). 
 34. Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 40714074 (2006). 
 35. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc2000cc-5 
(2006). 
 36. For further information on how we coded a religious-liberty decision on the merits, 
see Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1207–11; Sisk, Heise & Morriss, 
supra note 17, at 546–48. 
 37. Every decision was independently coded by both a trained law student and one of the 
authors. For more detailed information about our study, data collection, and coding, see the 
description published as part of our prior study of religious-liberty decisions from 1986–1995, 
Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 530–54, 571–612. The few changes in the selection of 
variables and coding from the prior study may be found by reviewing our table and coding. See 
supra note 28. 
 38. For a further discussion of judicial participations as the data point, see Sisk, Heise & 
Morriss, supra note 17, at 539–41. 
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regression analysis, the religious-liberty claim was favorably received by the 
ruling judge at a rate of 35.5%.39 
The dependent variable was the direction of the individual judge’s vote 
in each case, coded as “1” when the Religious Free 
Exercise/Accommodation claim was accepted and as “0” when it was 
rejected. Because we analyzed the influences of multiple variables, multiple 
regression models were adopted. Because the dependent variable was 
dichotomous, we used logistic regression.40 
2. Clustering Standard Errors at the Judge and Circuit Levels 
Recognizing that judicial rulings may not be fully independent from 
one another by reason of precedential constraints within a circuit or because 
of the repeated participation of the same judge in multiple cases, we 
adjusted the standard errors by clustering on one level or another. In the 
Establishment Clause phase of our study, we found no substantive 
differences between clustering standard errors at the circuit level and at the 
judge level. Because the chosen dimension made no substantive difference, 
and believing that those Establishment Clause cases were somewhat more 
likely to be responsive to circuit precedent, we reported the regression 
results in that companion article with clustering at the circuit level.41 
In this Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation phase of study, 1379 of 
the 1631 observations (84.6%) were made by judges who participated in 
more than one decision, indicating that standard errors should be adjusted 
by clustering at the individual judge level. Both Establishment Clause and 
Free Exercise cases typically raise “constitutional fact” disputes,42 where the 
salience or comparative weight of factual elements of the case are at the core 
of the constitutional question. Such constitutional claims demand de novo 
judicial evaluation similar to that used when resolving questions of law, even 
on appellate review.43 While recognizing the legal nature of these 
 
 39. In our prior 1986–1995 study, Free Exercise/Accommodation claimants prevailed at a 
rate of 35.6%, id. at 553, reflecting a truly astoundingly stable rate of success across two 
decades, varying only by one-tenth of a percentage point. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1213 & n.43. 
 42. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 n.8 (1987) (explaining that “any factual 
findings subsumed in [a constitutional] determination are subject to constitutional fact review” 
by the appellate court and thus demand non-deferential evaluation by each judicial actor); Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (“[I]n cases raising First 
Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an appellate court has an obligation to ‘make 
an independent examination of the whole record’” to determine the constitutional importance 
of the facts of the case (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284–86 (1964))). See 
generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985). 
 43. See First Vagabonds Church of God v. City of Orlando, 638 F.3d 756, 760 (11th Cir. 
2011) (holding that, in Free Exercise Cases, “[courts] review the core constitutional facts de 
novo, unlike historical facts, which are measured only for clear error” (quoting Bloedorn v. 
Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Faustin v. 
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dispositions, Free Exercise decisions appeared to be less affected by circuit-
specific precedents. Based on our review of the opinions, the Free Exercise 
cases appeared more likely to turn on each judge’s evaluation of the legal 
merits of individual claims and the government’s defenses—that is, a 
comparative evaluation of the burden on the claimant’s practice of religion 
against the magnitude of the interests cited by the government in resisting 
accommodation. Following the path of other researchers who study judicial 
decision-making, we also apprehend that a larger number of clusters 
enhances the accuracy of inferences.44 
For these reasons, and mindful that “[c]lustering helps mitigate the 
underestimation of standard errors . . . and reduces the risk of rejecting a 
true null,”45 we have adopted clustering at the judge level as the first of our 
primary models in the current phase of the study. We employed clustering at 
the circuit level as an alternative primary model. 
We report the results of both clustering approaches in the regression 
table below. Results from these two primary models are similar but not 
identical, as some variables meet significance levels for one clustering 
approach but not the other. We note those differences in significance of 
variables when relevant in the discussion below. We also used alternative 
proxies for ideology, which produced nearly identical results. For 
convenience, we created a table for the model using “Common Space 
Scores” to measure ideology.46 
3. Statistical Significance for Finding a Correlation Between an 
Independent (Explanatory Variable) and the Dependent (Outcome) 
Variable 
Among social scientists, statistical significance is traditionally set at the 
p < .05 level (or 95% probability level).47 This roughly means that the 
probability (“p”) that the reported association between an independent 
variable and dependent variable is a product of chance is less than (“<“) 1 in 
 
City of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1195–96 (10th Cir. 2005) (“We also review the district court’s 
findings of constitutional fact in a First Amendment claim and conclusions of law de novo.”). 
 44. In our primary model, the standard error was adjusted for 581 clusters by judge. 
 45. Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual 
Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 837 n.168 (2009). 
 46. On Common Space Scores as a proxy for judicial ideology, see Sisk & Heise, 
Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1222–26. On proxy variables for measuring judicial 
ideology, see Sisk & Heise, Judges and Ideology, supra note 17, at 769–94. 
 47. See ALAN AGRESTI & BARBARA FINLAY, STATISTICAL METHODS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
154 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining that researchers generally “do not regard the evidence against 
[the null hypothesis] as strong unless P is very small, say, P < 0.05 or P < 0.01”); see also David A. 
Gulley, The Adoption of Statistical Tests by Natural Scientists: An Empirical Analysis 19 (Columbia 
Univ. Dep’t of Indus. Eng’g & Operations Research, Working Paper, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012659 (finding that, for natural scientists conducting empirical 
research, the statistical significant test of 95% probability or higher had become “almost 
universal” during the twentieth century). 
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20, or 5% (“.05”).48 We acknowledge that selection of the 95% probability 
level as the benchmark for identifying those variables deserving interpretive 
attention is arbitrary. We appreciate that the difference between, say, p < .05 
and p < .07 is “not itself statistically significant.”49 Indeed, some researchers 
contend “that a finding of ‘statistical’ significance, or the lack of it, statistical 
insignificance, is on its own almost valueless, a meaningless parlor game.”50 
In challenging the convention of statistical significance, these scholars argue 
that the effect size of the correlation is more important than the probability 
level for dismissing the null hypothesis of no effect.51 Nonetheless, for our 
own empirical work in the field of judicial decision-making, where we 
believe that the first question remains whether an association between 
selected variables actually does exist,52 we cautiously adhere to the p < .05 
(or smaller) standard to report a finding. 
Accordingly, in the present study, we regard an observed correlation 
found between variables in our study as reliable only when it is statistically 
significant at the p < .05 or 95% probability level or better in one of our two 
primary models—clustering at the (1) judge or (2) circuit levels. When that 
association in a primary model is statistically significant or marginally 
significant in the alternative primary model as well, we express greater 
confidence in the reliability of that finding. When empirical scholars refer to 
a statistical correlation as “marginally significant,” they typically mean that 
the probability level approaches, but does not reach, statistical significance, 
usually at the p < .10 level.53 To be clear, however, marginal significance is 
not our standard for reporting a finding, but rather is corroboration that a 
 
 48. Stated technically, statistical significance measures the likelihood that an estimated 
regression coefficient for an explanatory variable was generated by random variation when the 
true coefficient value is zero. Significance at the .05 level means that we can be 95% confident 
that the actual coefficient is not zero, which thus allows us to draw the inference that there is a 
correlation between the explanatory (independent) variable and the dependent variable. 
 49. See Andrew Gelman & Hal Stern, The Difference Between “Significant” and “Not Significant” 
Is Not Itself Statistically Significant, 60 AM. STATISTICIAN 328, 328 (2006). 
 50. STEPHEN T. ZILIAK & DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, THE CULT OF STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE: 
HOW THE STANDARD ERROR COSTS US JOBS, JUSTICE, AND LIVES 2 (2008). 
 51. See id. 
 52. But see id. at 4–5 (criticizing the statistical significance test as failing to “ask how much” 
and instead “ask[ing] ‘whether,’” and asserting that “[e]xistence, the question of whether, is 
interesting [but] it is not scientific”). 
 53. See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The 
Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision To Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1353, 1375 (2009); Anthony Niblett, Richard A. Posner & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of a 
Legal Rule, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 346 n.20 (2010); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey 
J. Rachlinski, Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1302 n.204 (2005). See generally Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 
1301, 1314 n.58 (Cal. 1980) (“Normally in the social sciences, a ‘p’ value of .05 is said to be 
‘statistically significant.’ Values between .05 and .10 are said to be ‘marginally significant,’ and a 
‘p’ value of .01 is considered ‘highly significant.’ A ‘p’ value above .10 is generally said to be 
‘not significant.’”). 
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finding in one model remains reasonably robust in another model. For the 
reader who believes our strict approach to be unduly conservative or who 
wishes for more detailed information, we have made our data set and other 
information available on-line, including regression analyses of our primary 
models complete with probability values for every independent variable.54 
We do agree that, beyond statistical significance, the substantive size of 
the effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable deserves 
central attention. As Professor Frank Cross reminds us, “the reader should 
not place undue importance on a finding of statistical significance, because 
such a finding shows a correlation between variables but by itself does not 
prove the substantive significance of that correlation.”55 As Cross 
emphasizes, “[o]ne must also consider the magnitude of the association.”56 
In the discussion that follows, we chart most statistically significant findings 
in terms of predicted probabilities, along with confidence intervals, to 
describe the substantive size of the effect as well. 
TABLE 1 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR RELIGIOUS FREE EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION DECISIONS, 
FEDERAL COURTS, 1996–2005 
 Model 1:  
Standard Errors 
Adjusted for Clusters  
by Judge 
Model 2: 
Standard Errors 
Adjusted for Clusters  
by Circuit 
Case Type   
Regulation .435 (.378) .435 (.633) 
Public Education 
(Elementary) 
.714 (.378) .714* (.332) 
Public Education 
(Secondary/Higher) .689 (.418) .689 (.388) 
Private Education 1.005* (.438) 1.005* (.501) 
Religious Meetings 1.040 (.539) 1.040 (.725) 
Religious Expression 1.113*** (.313) 1.113** (.363) 
Zoning .364 (.369) .364 (.569) 
Prisoner .971** (.340) .971 (.531) 
Employment Discrimination .642 (.339) .642 (.457) 
  
 
 54. See supra note 28. 
 55. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 4 (2007). 
 56. Id. 
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 Model 1 Model 2 
Case Type   
Exemption from Anti-
Discrimination Laws 1.766*** (.422) 1.766** (.606) 
Criminal -.502 (.402) -.502 (.731) 
Claimant Religion     
Catholic -.049 (.246) -.049 (.458) 
Mainline Protestant -.016 (.375) -.016 (.511) 
Baptist -.087 (.346) -.087 (.329) 
Christian Variation .445 (.443) .445 (.355) 
Seventh-Day Adventist -.252 (.422) -.252 (.696) 
Jehovah’s Witness -.307 (.457) -.307 (.860) 
Jewish Orthodox .413 (.281) .413 (.397) 
Jewish Other -.309 (.279) -.309 (.443) 
Muslim -.767*** (.218) -.767 (.399) 
Native American .253 (.283) .253 (.561) 
Rastafarian .696* (.355) .696 (.612) 
Buddhist 1.048** (.408) 1.048 (.627) 
White Separatist -.275 (.406) -.275 (.514) 
Black Separatist -2.294** (.740) -2.294* (.939) 
Other -.210 (.216) -.210 (.371) 
Institutional Religious 
Claimant 
.501* (.201) .501 (.327) 
Defensive Free Exercise 
Claim .493 (.313) .493 (.418) 
Judge Religion     
Catholic -.012 (.163) -.012 (.107) 
Baptist -.175 (.259) -.175 (.216) 
Other Christian -.157 (.245) -.157 (.135) 
Jewish .019 (.184) .019 (.212) 
Other -.165 (.355) -.165 (.207) 
None -.070 (.185) -.070 (.176) 
Religious Correlation 
Between Judge and Claimant 
-.607* (.292) -.607* (.269) 
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 Model 1: Model 2: 
Judge Sex and Race     
Sex (Female) .162 (.163) .162 (.106) 
African American .203 (.212) .203 (.245) 
Latino .468 (.267) .468* (.224) 
Asian 1.239** (.392) 1.239*** (.167) 
Judge Ideology or Attitude 
Factors 
    
Common Space Score -.136 (.180) -.136 (.147) 
ABA Rating—Above 
Qualified 
.055 (.135) .055 (.150) 
ABA Rating—Below 
Qualified .322 (.219) .322 (.176) 
Seniority on Federal Bench -.001 (.001) -.001 (.001) 
Elite Law School -.051 (.128) -.051 (.070) 
Judge Employment Background     
Military .079 (.146) .079 (.131) 
Government -.086 (.122) -.086 (.102) 
State or Local Judge -.112 (.136) -.112 (.149) 
Law Professor .303 (.159) .303* (.120) 
Community Demographics     
Catholic Percentage -.010 (.005) -.010* (.004) 
Jewish Percentage .002 (.012) .002 (.012) 
Adherence Rate .011 (.006) .011 (.007) 
Precedent and Timing Variables     
Boerne .104 (.249) .104 (.403) 
After 9/11 .092 (.223) .092 (.338) 
Year of Decision -.009 (.050) -.009 (.081) 
(Constant) 16.375 (98.957) 16.375 (160.806) 
Pseudo R2 .091  .091  
Percent Explained 67.26  67.26  
N 1631  1631  
Notes: Free Exercise Successful Outcome = 1. 
* p < .05;  ** p < .01;  *** p < .001. 
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B. RELIGIOUS CLAIMANT VARIABLES: IDENTITY AND CODING 
FIGURE 1 
RELIGIOUS FREE EXERCISE CLAIMANTS BY RELIGION AS PERCENTAGE OF OBSERVATIONS, 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 TO DECEMBER 31, 2005 
 
 
 
For the 1631 observations in Religious Free Exercise/Accommodations 
cases in which the religious affiliation of claimants could be determined, we 
coded claimants57 into sixteen general categories, for which dummy 
variables were created. 
  
 
 57. In the rare case in which claimants from more than one religious background were 
involved in a case, the affiliation of the lead claimant was coded. 
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TABLE 2 
CLAIMANTS BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION 
Religious Affiliation Percent (n) 
Catholic 8.0% (n = 130) 
Mainline Protestant 3.2% (n = 53) 
Baptist 2.5% (n = 41) 
Christian (Other) 
(primarily members of non-denominational, 
evangelical, and fundamentalist churches) 
28.5% (n = 465) 
Christian (Variation)  
(Mormons, Christian Scientists, and Unitarians) 
1.3% (n = 22) 
Seventh-Day Adventist 1.7% (n = 28) 
Jehovah’s Witness 1.7% (n = 28) 
Jewish (Orthodox) 4.4% (n = 72) 
Jewish (Other) 5.9% (n = 96) 
Muslim 17.0% (n = 277) 
Native American 6.3% (n = 103) 
Rastafarian 2.8% (n = 45) 
Buddhist 1.7% (n = 27) 
White Separatist  2.1% (n = 34) 
Black Separatist 2.0% (n = 33) 
Other (including Sikh, Wiccan, and New Age) 10.9% (n = 177) 
TOTAL 100% (n = 1631) 
 
By examining pleadings and other court documents through the 
PACER federal court dockets system, we were able to confirm religious 
affiliation for a much larger proportion of claimants than in our prior 1986–
1995 study, even in cases where the claimant’s religion was not identified in 
the opinion itself. In the present 1996–2005 study, we could not determine 
the religious affiliation of 7.7% of the claimants (n = 136). By contrast, in 
our 1986–1995 study, we had been unable to determine the religious 
affiliation of 19.1% of claimants—a figure nearly three times higher than in 
the current study. In both this and the prior studies, we were forced to treat 
these observations as missing when analyzing claimant-religious-affiliation 
dummy variables. 
While no manifestly obvious candidate emerged as the appropriate 
reference variable, we selected “Christian (Other)” because it collected 
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together various Christian adherents without a clear denominational 
association and thus appeared to be most representative of the Christian 
mainstream. Not incidentally, this was the largest category, which is 
ordinarily preferable as a reference category. 
In our coding of Muslim claimants (which proved to be the claimant 
variable of most interest for this period),58 we included the full diversity of 
American Islam. We followed in the steps of prior research, notably 
including the Pew Research Center’s and Gallup, Inc.’s surveys of Muslim 
Americans (which we address later in this Article),59 in relying upon self-
identification by the individual. Accordingly, those religious-liberty claimants 
who identified as Sunni or Shi’i (often rendered in western media as 
“Shia”), as well as those who reported they were Muslim without any 
additional affiliation and those who said they belonged to the Nation of 
Islam (“NOI”), were included in our data set.60 
The NOI diverges in doctrine from Sunni and Shi’i Islam in several 
ways. The NOI elevates founder Fard Muhammad, and subsequent leader 
Elijah Muhammad, to an incarnation of God and a holy prophet, 
respectively, while orthodox Islam regards God as wholly other than human 
and believes the Prophet Muhammad to whom the Qur’an was revealed to 
be the final prophet.61 Moreover, the NOI’s emphasis on race stands in 
contrast to the universalism of mainstream Islam. While some Islamic studies 
scholars see the NOI as moving toward Sunni Islam,62 others scholars 
question whether the NOI accepts the central religious tenets of Islam.63 
Nonetheless, the NOI has been a highly visible representation of Islam 
in the United States and has been a way station for many Americans who 
 
 58. In our companion article, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench, we report additional 
results of our Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation study for 1996–2005, including our 
findings that cases involving exemption from anti-discrimination laws were significantly more 
likely to result in pro-accommodation rulings and that Asian and Latino judges as well as judges 
who were former law professors were particularly favorable to Free Exercise and 
Accommodation claims. Heise & Sisk, Religion Before the Bench, supra note 17. 
 59. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 76 
(2007) [hereinafter 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS], available at http://pewresearch.org/ 
assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf (providing survey results on question about religious 
preferences); THE MUSLIM WEST FACTS PROJECT, MUSLIM AMERICANS: A NATIONAL PORTRAIT 10 
(2009) [hereinafter 2009 GALLUP MUSLIM AMERICANS], available at http://www.gallup.com/ 
strategicconsulting/153572/REPORT-Muslim-Americans-National-Portrait.aspx (explaining 
that respondents “self-identified as Muslims”). 
 60. See 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 22 (including those affiliated with 
the NOI among American Muslims). 
 61. On the doctrine of the NOI, see generally Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Islam Among African 
Americans: An Overview, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE: HOPE, FEARS, AND 
ASPIRATIONS 222, 237–43 (Zahid H. Bukhari et al. eds., 2004). 
 62. See Aminah Beverly McCloud, Conceptual Discourse: Living as a Muslim in a Pluralistic 
Society, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 73, 82. 
 63. Ansari, supra note 61, at 237, 259. 
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later associated with Sunni Islam,64 most notably Malcolm X and two of the 
sons of Elijah Muhammad.65 In any event, few claimants in our study 
volunteered that they were affiliated with the NOI, most declaring 
themselves to be Muslim without more specific description (a few of whom 
undoubtedly were members of the NOI).66 
Relying on self-identification by claimants as Muslim has further merit 
in this context, where the study seeks to uncover the attitudes of judicial 
decision-makers toward religious-liberty claimants’ proclaimed affiliations. 
Moreover, for Muslim claimants, Free Exercise claims typically involved 
prayer and worship rituals and dietary requirements,67 subjects on which the 
NOI has adopted orthodox Muslim rules.68 
By contrast, we separately coded members of black separatist religious 
groups—such as the Moorish Temple and the Five Percenters.69 While 
sharing some beliefs and holy days with mainstream Islam, these sects have 
diverged even further (such as eschewing prayer to Allah in the belief that 
all black men are gods),70 and their adherents distinctively identified 
themselves as belonging to those sects rather than being Muslims. 
III.  THE RESULTS: THE MUSLIM DISADVANTAGE IN RELIGIOUS-LIBERTY CASES 
A. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON MUSLIM RELIGIOUS-LIBERTY CLAIMANTS ACROSS 
TWENTY-YEAR SPAN OF STUDY 
Across the now twenty-year span of decisions in our continuing 
empirical study of religious-liberty rulings in the lower federal courts, 
 
 64. See Farida Jalalzai, The Politics of Muslims in America, 2 POL. & RELIGION 163, 166 
(2009) (“[M]ost African-American[ ] [Muslims] are converts to Islam, many initially entering as 
followers of the Nation of Islam.”). 
 65. See Ansari, supra note 61, at 243–47, 251–54. 
 66. In the prison setting, from which arise most of the Muslim religious-liberty claims in 
our study, Sunni Muslims significantly outnumber members of the NOI. While religious 
demographic data on prisoners is not readily available for all prison settings, detailed data 
pertinent to the era of our study from New York state prisons in 2003 and a study on Ohio state 
prisons published in 2004 suggest that mainstream Muslims outnumber NOI members by more 
than three-to-one. See DAN BERNSTEIN, STATE OF N.Y. DEP’T OF CORR. SERVS., RELIGIOUS 
AFFILIATION OF UNDERCUSTODY POPULATION 5 tbl.2.1 (2003) (reporting 9868 prisoners 
identifying with Islam generally and 2900 with NOI); Nawal H. Ammar, Robert R. Weaver & 
Sam Saxon, Muslims in Prison: A Case Study from Ohio State Prisons, 48 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY 
& COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 414, 421 tbl.2 (2004) (using a sample from Ohio prisons containing 79 
prisoners who affiliated with American Muslim Mission, 26 with the NOI, and 25 with no 
preference or who attended mosques from either affiliation). 
 67. See infra notes 189–90 and accompanying text. 
 68. See Ansari, supra note 61, at 258 (noting that Minister Louis Farrakhan has effected 
changes in religious rituals leaning toward mainstream Islam). 
 69. On the Moorish Temple and the Five Percenters, see Ansari, supra note 61, at 235–36, 
259. 
 70. See Self-Allah v. Annucci, No. 97-CV-607(H), 1999 WL 299310, at *2–6 (W.D.N.Y. 
Mar. 25, 1999) (reporting self-description of “Five Percenters” about their religion). 
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evidence that Muslim claimants have been at a disadvantage has been 
accumulating. In our 1986–1995 study, we refrained from describing the 
evidence we had found as a finding, suggesting instead that the matter 
deserved further attention and additional study. Now having examined 
religious-liberty decisions over an additional ten-year span, we do find—with 
the conventions of statistical significance fully satisfied—that Muslim 
claimants were indeed significantly less likely than non-Muslims to 
successfully raise Religious Free Exercise and Accommodation claims, 
especially in the federal courts of appeals. 
In our 1986–1995 study, the Muslim claimant variable did not 
approach significance in our standard model (reaching only the 83% 
probability level).71 Interestingly, when district court and court of appeals 
judges were examined using separate regression analyses, the Muslim 
variable did rise to the p < .01 level (or 99% probability level) for statistical 
significance, and in the same negative direction.72 Both because our primary 
model combined these two sets of judges and because we found it odd that 
the variable would be significant for each separately but slide well out of 
significance when they were combined, we reported those results but did not 
present them as a finding. We additionally found that Muslims were 
significantly less likely to succeed when claiming unequal treatment or 
discrimination.73 
“[A]t least pending further study,” we concluded in that prior 1986–
1995 study, “there is some evidence that adherents to Islam, apparently 
alone among the non-Christian religious faiths, may encounter greater 
resistance in pressing claims for religious accommodation in federal 
courts.”74 
Having progressed forward another ten years, examining federal court 
decisions from 1996 to 2005, the present study confirms the informed 
hunch we had at the conclusion of that earlier study nearly a decade ago. 
Among all of the diverse categories of religious claimants included in the 
primary models of our present study, Muslims nearly alone were significantly 
and powerfully associated with a negative outcome before the federal courts 
(the minor exception being Black Separatists, for whom a significant 
negative association also persisted, mostly in prisoner cases).75 Claimants 
from other religious communities were nearly twice as likely to prevail as 
Muslims. 
In our primary regression model (clustering standard errors at the 
judge level), the variable for Muslim claimants was highly significant at the 
 
 71. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 566. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 566–67. 
 75. See Heise & Sisk, Religion Before the Bench, supra note 17, at 17. 
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p < .001 level (or 99.9% probability level). The Muslim variable remains 
marginally significant in the alternative model (clustering standard errors at 
the circuit level), falling inside the p < .06 level, as well as in alternative 
models using political party as the proxy for judicial ideology. 
As explained in greater detail in our companion article describing the 
results of the Establishment Clause phase of our study, our primary model 
for religious-liberty decisions combines rulings by both district court and 
court of appeals judges for unitary analysis.76 In resolving the central 
constitutional issues in a case, trial and appellate courts share parallel 
responsibilities. The deferential standard of appellate review that is 
ordinarily applied to a trial court’s factual findings is subject to the 
“constitutional fact” exception for “factual” disputes that lie at the core of a 
constitutional question.77 For these and other reasons, we concluded that 
expanding our empirical study beyond appellate judges and evaluating the 
behavior of a larger and more inclusive set of lower federal judges has much 
merit, especially in this context of rulings on constitutional and parallel 
statutory claims. 
However, in this Free Exercise/Accommodation phase of our study, 
when judges from each of the lower federal courts are examined separately 
in the primary model, the Muslim variable falls well out of significance for 
district court judges, while remaining highly significant for court of appeals 
judges (at the p < .001 or 99.9% probability level). As reported in Figure 3 
below, the disparity in success rates between Muslims and non-Muslims is 
even greater when court of appeals judge rulings are examined separately 
rather than combined with district court judge rulings. Our findings for 
court of appeals judges may also be more solidly grounded. Our data set of 
all digested Westlaw opinions includes a larger share of the universe of 
published and unpublished federal appellate decisions (excluding only 
summary dispositions that were not digested) than is likely to be the case for 
district court decisions in the Free Exercise/Accommodation area. In 
addition, the disproportion in our study between judicial participations by 
federal appellate judges and trial judges is high, with 1236 (75.8%) by court 
of appeals judges and 395 (24.2%) by district court judges. Accordingly, 
while we report our findings and measure the effect size under both unitary 
and separate analyses, the reader may reasonably conclude that the findings 
in this study apply primarily or with more emphasis to federal appellate 
judges. 
 
 76. See Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1208–10. 
 77. See supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text. In the Free Exercise context, most of 
the statute-based claims are parallel to claims founded directly on the First Amendment, with 
some exception for discrimination-based claims. 
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B. MEASURING THE SIZE OF THE MUSLIM DISADVANTAGE 
Our finding that Muslim claimants were less likely than claimants of 
other religions to prevail when raising religious-liberty claims in the lower 
federal courts, and most specifically in the courts of appeals, is reliable, 
confirmed by conventions of statistical significance. And the size of that 
effect is substantial. As shown in Figure 2, holding all other independent 
variables constant at their means, the predicted probability that a Muslim 
claimant would succeed in presenting a Religious Free 
Exercise/Accommodation claim to an individual federal judge was 22.2%, 
while non-Muslim claimants would succeed at a rate of 38.0%. 
FIGURE 2 
PREDICTED PROBABILITY THAT A CLAIMANT WILL SUCCEED ON A RELIGIOUS FREE 
EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION CLAIM, BY MUSLIM IDENTITY 
The vertical lines in Figure 2 represent the 95% confidence intervals 
for these two predictions. By “95 percent confidence interval,” statisticians 
mean that the interval is “one within which we are 95 percent certain that 
the true variable value falls.”78 Thus, while our best estimate is that a Muslim 
claimant had a 22.2% likelihood of succeeding on a Religious Free 
Exercise/Accommodation claim, the probability could be as low as 15.6% or 
as high as 28.8%. Similarly, while we predict that a non-Muslim claimant 
 
 78. ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL 
METHODS IN LAW 239 (2010); see also Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew M. Schneider, 
On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1811, 
1814 (2006) (“Such is the reality of the statistical world: We can never be certain about our best 
guesses (i.e., inferences) because they themselves are based on estimates. We can, however, 
report our level of uncertainty (e.g., a confidence interval) about those guesses.”). 
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would succeed 38.0% of the time, the probability could be as low as 35.0% 
or as high as 41.1%. 
The probability that the comparative values would appear both in the 
higher end of the interval for a Muslim claimant and in the lower end of the 
interval for a non-Muslim claimant is much lower than 5%, strengthening 
our confidence that the disparity between the two is not only significant in 
statistical probability but quite substantial in size. Indeed, even before 
adjusting for other independent variables in a regression, the raw frequency 
success rate before federal judges was 37.9% for non-Muslim claimants, 
while only 22.7% for Muslims. 
When judicial participations from each of the lower federal courts in 
our study are examined separately in our primary model, the Muslim 
variable falls well out of significance for district court judges but becomes 
highly significant (at the p < .001 or 99.9% probability level) for court of 
appeals judges. And the magnitude of the effect not only remains 
substantial, but increases slightly, for court of appeals judges. 
As shown in Figure 3, holding all other independent variables constant, 
the predicted probability that a Muslim claimant would succeed in 
presenting a Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation claim to a federal 
court of appeals judge was 21.4%, while non-Muslim claimants succeeded at 
a rate of 38.9%.79 
FIGURE 3 
PREDICTED PROBABILITY THAT A CLAIMANT WILL SUCCEED ON A RELIGIOUS FREE 
EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION CLAIM, BY MUSLIM IDENTITY  
(COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES ONLY) 
 
 79. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate by a Muslim claimant before 
court of appeals judges ranges from 13.6% to 29.1%, and for non-Muslim claimants from 
35.5% to 42.3%. 
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To examine whether there was a more specific “9/11 Effect”—that is, 
whether there was a shift in the legal landscape for Muslim religious-liberty 
claimants following the terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C. and New York 
City—we also conducted separate but parallel analyses of cases decided both 
before and after September 11, 2001. This date restriction produces nearly 
an even division of the 1996–2005 decisions, with 48% of judicial 
participations occurring before 9/11 and 52% afterward. When separated 
into sets of pre-9/11 cases and post-9/11 cases, the Muslim variable 
remained significant for the pre-9/11 period (January 1, 1996 to September 
10, 2001) and slips barely out of significance but stays inside the p < .06 level 
for the post-9/11 period (September 11, 2001 to December 31, 2005). 
In raw frequencies, Muslim claimants achieved a favorable response 
from judges at a rate of 24.4% before 9/11 and then at a slightly lower rate 
of 21.2% afterward. When all other explanatory variables are held constant 
in a regression analysis, the predicted probability of success for a Muslim 
claimant is 21.9% before 9/1180 and rises slightly to 24.1% after 9/11.81 In 
any event, these differences are relatively small and their confidence 
intervals preclude any confident conclusion about genuine movement in 
either direction between these two periods. In addition, we included a 
control variable for 9/11, which did not prove significant in our primary 
model, although that 9/11 control variable did rise to significance in a 
separate regression analysis of prisoner-only cases before the courts of 
appeals. 
Moreover, assuming the post-9/11 months were perceived by Muslim 
Americans as a period of backlash against Islam, we would expect those 
perceptions to play a strategic role in their decisions whether or not to 
litigate their religious-liberty claims. Under the Priest–Klein Hypothesis, 
plaintiff win rates in cases that actually are litigated to judgment will trend 
toward 50% regardless of the substantive standard of law.82 Rational litigants 
will adjust their behavior by agreeing to settle rather than continue with 
litigation based on their predictions of success in light of that legal standard, 
meaning that only close cases will actually proceed to trial. 
To be sure, the Priest–Klein Hypothesis is “not an iron law,”83 is based 
solely on economic determinants for settlement and litigation,84 and 
 
 80. For the pre-9/11 period, the 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate by a 
Muslim claimant ranges from 11.4% to 32.5%, and for non-Muslim claimants from 34.4% to 
42.8%. 
 81. For the post-9/11 period, the 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate by a 
Muslim claimant ranges from 14.5% to 33.6%, and for non-Muslim claimants from 32.1% to 
40.5%. 
 82. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 5, 8, 14–15, 17 (1984). 
 83. Matthew C. Turk, Why Does the Complainant Always Win at the WTO?: A Reputation-Based 
Theory of Litigation at the World Trade Organization, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 385, 397 (2011). 
 84. Priest & Klein, supra note 82, at 4. 
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assumes “primarily that the parties have equal stakes in the litigation.”85 In 
religious-liberty cases, many persons of faith whose free exercise of religion 
is severely burdened by government rules or decisions may feel that they 
have no alternative but to press forward with litigation despite a weak 
prospect for success; religious plaintiffs’ requests for accommodation may 
have little or no economic benefit or cost; or government defendants may be 
less motivated by either financial impact or litigation costs in deciding 
whether and how to defend against such claims. 
Nonetheless, even in the religious-liberty context, litigation trends 
surely are affected to some degree by litigation costs and rational predictions 
of success or failure in court, as well as by strategic considerations regarding 
public perception and the impact of negative court rulings. Thus, we would 
expect Muslims in the post-9/11 period to withhold more religious-liberty 
claims, choosing instead to accept the burdens and costs of non-
accommodation when possible, or to withdraw from sectors of public and 
economic life if necessary to avoid a conflict over religious principle. During 
such a difficult period, and perhaps more generally, we would expect 
Muslims to resort to the courts only when their claims were strongest on the 
merits. If these assumptions are correct, such rational responses to a 
challenging situation may explain why success rates for Muslim religious-
liberty claimants who litigated after 9/11 did not fall or may have even risen 
slightly. 
In sum, we have confidence in the overall finding that Muslim claimants 
generally had a lower success rate than non-Muslim claimants in the lower 
federal courts (and especially before judges of the courts of appeals) 
between 1996 and 2005. Although the evidence is mixed and the possibility 
of strategic adjustment cannot be ignored, there is no strong evidence of a 
specific “9/11 effect” leading to a marked decline in the Muslim success rate 
in Religious Free Exercise claims following the 2001 terrorist attacks. For 
the ten-year span from 1996 to 2005, our findings translate into a predicted 
success rate for Muslim claimants that is only slightly better than half that for 
other religious claimants. Especially in light of the trend we observed in our 
1986–1995 study,86 the Muslim deficit in religious-liberty litigation success 
appears to be real and persistent at least through 2005. 
 
 85. Ahmed E. Taha, Judge Shopping: Testing Whether Judges’ Political Orientations Affect Case 
Filings, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2010); see also Priest & Klein, supra note 82, at 24 
(explaining that the model assumes “that the stakes of the relevant disputes are symmetric to 
plaintiffs and defendants”). 
 86. See supra Part III.A. 
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IV. AMERICAN ATTITUDES ABOUT ISLAM AND ALTERNATE THEORIES OF THE 
MUSLIM DISADVANTAGE 
A. THE AMERICAN PROMISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND THE MUSLIM EXPERIENCE 
Like Catholic and Jewish immigrants before them, Muslims coming to 
America (as well as the increasing numbers of native-born Muslims) strive to 
maintain their identity and hold fast to their core beliefs while integrating 
into the mainstream of American life. Whether “the robust promise [of] the 
American experiment [in religious liberty] still holds”87 will be tested in the 
coming years by the experiences of Muslims as fellow citizens, coworkers, 
and neighbors. If that promise is kept, that message of freedom may 
resonate well beyond our own borders. 
Although it came only after a struggle spanning many decades, 
Catholics have succeeded in realizing the American Dream—prospering 
economically, thriving in society, and achieving parity in political, 
educational, and employment activity—without sacrificing their faith. And 
that success played no small role in the development of a better 
understanding of the virtues of religious liberty within the universal Catholic 
Church. In his famous book, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the 
American Proposition, published in 1960 on the eve of the Second Vatican 
Council, as well as in earlier theological writings, American Jesuit John 
Courtney Murray offered the success of the unique American experiment in 
religious liberty as evidence of a new moral truth consistent with the natural 
law tradition of the Catholic Church.88 
While also drawing on the traditional Catholic principle of conscience 
and the work of other Catholic scholars such as French philosopher Jacques 
Maritain on the dignity of the human person,89 the Second Vatican Council 
was greatly influenced by Murray and his observations about religious liberty 
in the American context.90 At the close of the Council in 1965, Pope Paul VI 
promulgated Dignitatis Humanae (The Declaration on Religious Freedom) 
formally declaring as Catholic teaching that “the right to religious freedom 
has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person.”91 Writing about 
 
 87. See JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT, at xiii 
(2d ed. 2005). 
 88. JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE 
AMERICAN PROPOSITION (1960). 
 89. Catherine M. A. McCauliff, Jacques Maritain’s Embrace of Religious Pluralism and the 
Declaration on Religious Freedom, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 593, 594, 601 (2011). 
 90. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 331–53 (1998); Richard W. Garnett, Francis Bacon Takes on the Ghouls, 3 
GREEN BAG 2D 447, 454–55 (2000) (reviewing JOHN WITTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES (2000)). 
 91. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DECLARATION ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: 
DIGNITATIS HUMANAE § 2 (1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ 
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Murray and the Second Vatican Council, Judge John Noonan observes that 
“the Declaration on Religious Freedom would not have come into existence 
without the American contribution and the experiment that began with 
Madison.”92 
As Professor Kristine Kalanges writes, “Catholics in the United States 
were witnesses to the fact that a truth-proclaiming religion could prosper in 
a pluralistic society.”93 Likewise, she observes, “[i]nsofar as they thrive here, 
American Muslims . . . could bear witness to the Muslim world that religious 
freedom is compatible with the practice of (at least certain visions of) 
Islam.”94 While such a development has “the potential to be profound,” 
Kalanges warns that it is not inevitable.95 
Unfortunately, for at least three reasons, each of which is discussed in 
more detail in succeeding parts of this Article, believers in Islam may face a 
steeper climb to full-fledged acceptance into the American mainstream than 
did Catholics and Jews.96 Muslims may find that accommodations from their 
new countrymen are less forthcoming than those that were grudgingly and 
gradually granted to Catholics and Jews on their journeys through the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
First, many Americans perceive Islam’s central tenets to be further 
distant from the religious mainstream in the United States than was the 
divergence of Catholic beliefs and Jewish traditions from the Protestant 
Christianity that dominated the American religious landscape a century and 
more ago.97 Over time, Catholics and Jews have been elevated to “equal 
partnership status in the American religious triumvirate.”98 With America 
now increasingly described as “Judeo-Christian” in a more expansive 
compass of religious traditions, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are more 
likely today to find some theological common ground, emphasizing a 
 
ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html (English 
translation). 
 92. NOONAN, supra note 90, at 353. 
 93. KRISTINE KALANGES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC LAW: TOWARD A 
WORLD LEGAL TRADITION 163 (2012). 
 94. Id. at 164. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Cf. Christopher C. Lund, The New Victims of the Old Anti-Catholicism, 44 CONN. L. REV. 
1001, 1003–04, 1013–17 (2012) (describing how religious-liberty cases today often connect 
deeply with the nineteenth century history of anti-Catholicism in the United States, such as the 
case of a female Muslim police officer in Philadelphia who was prohibited from wearing a veil 
by citation to a still-extant Pennsylvania statute enacted in the nineteenth century to exclude 
Catholic priests and nuns from public employment because they wore cleric garb). 
 97. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 47 (1996) (referring to the “Protestant consensus” that prevailed at least until the late 
nineteenth century). 
 98. Id. at 58; see also WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT—CATHOLIC—JEW: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN 
RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY (Anchor Books rev. ed. 1960) (providing an analysis of Protestantism, 
Catholicism, and Judaism in modern American culture). 
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monotheistic unity, similarities in worship practices, some common Western 
history, and a connection to the Bible. 
At some future point, Muslims may be added to Catholics, Protestants, 
and Jews as within the common faith heritage of Americans because all of 
the “Abrahamic religions tend to share a substantial ethical foundation.”99 
But we have not yet reached the historical or cultural point where Islam has 
been received by public approbation to full partnership in an American 
religious “quadruple alliance.”100 For the moment, in the eyes of most 
Americans, Islam remains an outsider and minority religion in the United 
States.101 
Moreover, while beyond the scope of this study, we cannot dismiss the 
possibility that a racial element is also at play. The majority of followers of 
Islam in the United States are non-white, thus making Muslims in America a 
minority in ethnic and racial terms as well as in religious. According to the 
Pew Research Center, in 2007, 38% of American Muslims identified 
themselves as white (although a substantial majority are actually of Arab 
origin),102 26% as black, 20% as Asian, and 16% as mixed or other.103 A 
2009 Gallup Poll found a larger percentage of Muslim Americans self-
 
 99. Azizah Y. al-Hibri, Faith and the Attorney–Client Relationship: A Muslim Perspective, 66 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1131, 1139 (1998); see also JOHN L. ESPOSITO, PLURALISM IN MUSLIM–
CHRISTIAN RELATIONS 6 (2008), available at http://acmcu.georgetown.edu/files/20080401_ 
Pluralism_in_Muslim-Christian_Relations.pdf (“Both [Islam and Christianity] recognize and 
worship God as Creator, sustainer and Judge, share a belief in common prophets and in divine 
revelation to humankind, believe in moral responsibility and accountability, the last judgment 
and eternal reward and punishment.”). The “Three Grand Tenets” of Islam—monotheism, 
final judgment, and divine intervention in history—have parallels in Christian and Jewish 
teaching. See RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARĪ’A) 104–14 (2011). Even should 
Islam join Protestant Christianity, Catholic Christianity, and Judaism in the religious 
mainstream, recently departed Professor Steven Gey feared that a “reduction of all major 
branches of Western religious thought into a generic brand of monotheism” would, at least in 
the application of the Establishment Clause, “lead[] to the embrace of religious 
majoritarianism” to the detriment of those falling outside of that theological or sociological 
consensus. Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2007). 
 100. The term “quadruple alliance” originated with various strategic alliances among 
European powers, most prominently the Quadruple Alliance of Britain, Russia, Prussia, and 
Austria which followed the Napoleonic wars. See Myrna Boyce, The Diplomatic Relations of England 
with the Quadruple Alliance 1815–1830, U. IOWA STUD., Nov. 1918, at 1, 5, available at 
http://ia600406.us.archive.org/23/items/diplomaticrelati00boyc/diplomaticrelati00boyc.pdf. 
 101. See infra Part IV.B. 
 102. See Ilyas Ba-Yunus & Kassim Kone, Muslim Americans: A Demographic Report, in MUSLIMS’ 
PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 299, 317 (reporting that the largest 
ethnic group of American Muslims are those of Arab origin (32%), followed by mostly African 
American Muslims (29%)). 
 103. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 17–18. In a 2011 follow-up survey, the 
Pew Research Center found similar racial demographics, with 30% of Muslims identifying as 
white, 23% as black, 21% as Asian, 6% as Hispanic, and 19% as other or mixed. PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: NO SIGNS OF GROWTH IN ALIENATION OR SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM 16 
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS], available at http://www.people-
press.org/files/legacy-pdf/Muslim-American-Report.pdf. 
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identifying as African American (35%) and fewer classifying themselves as 
White (28%).104 While we were not able to code the religious claimants in 
our data set by race,105 we expect that a substantial majority of Muslim 
claimants in the present study were non-white.106 
Second, American Muslims today face cultural and political obstacles 
beyond and different from those that Catholics and Jews encountered from 
a Protestant–Christian hegemony in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. In today’s America, Muslims face opposition not only from 
members of other religions in America who regard them as religiously 
discordant or theologically deviant, but also from a growing number of 
secularists in certain circles of American cultural and political life.107 
Professor Noah Feldman describes two opposing camps in the debate over 
the proper role of religion in American public life—”values evangelicals” 
and “legal secularists.”108 Neither camp appears at present to be favorably 
disposed toward full-fledged participation by Muslims as people of faith in 
American public life. While “values evangelicals” might be expected to view 
Muslims as allies on certain social issues, suspicion and fear by many 
evangelical Christians hold Muslims apart.109 
 
 104. 2009 GALLUP MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 10, 20. 
 105. In coding claimants for Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation by religion, we did 
not and could not also code them by race. Because of the nature of the claims being raised, 
focused as they were on the claimant’s religion-based conflict with the government, the race of 
the claimants was not consistently revealed in court documents. While we might assume that 
most (but not all) followers of Native American religious traditions were themselves Native 
Americans (and claimants of that faith were not statistically significant in our study), we could 
not make similar assumptions about the other religious groupings included in the analysis. 
 106. As discussed elsewhere in this Article, see supra Part II.B; infra Part IV.B.3, nearly three-
quarters of Muslim claimants in our data set are prisoners, and the overwhelming majority of 
Muslim prisoners are black. Terrorist Recruitment and Infiltration in the United States: Prisons and 
Military as an Operational Base: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech., & Homeland Sec. of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Waller Testimony] (testimony of 
J. Michael Waller, Annenberg Professor of International Communication, Institute of World 
Politics), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing-search.cfm (select 
hearing year “2003” and search witness testimony for “Waller”; then follow “Dr. Michael Waller” 
hyperlink) (stating that Muslim inmates in prison “are overwhelmingly black with a small, but 
growing Hispanic minority”). 
 107. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 108. NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH–STATE PROBLEM—AND WHAT 
WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 7–8 (2005). 
 109. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., CONTINUING DIVIDE IN VIEWS OF ISLAM AND VIOLENCE 2 
(2011), available at http://people-press.org/files/2011/03/714.pdf (reporting that 60% of 
white evangelical Protestants regard Islam as more likely to encourage violence than other 
religions); Mohammed Nimer, Muslims in the American Body Politic, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 145, 157 (describing relationships between 
Muslims and the Christian Right as “uncertain and highly confrontational at times”); James M. 
Penning, Americans’ Views of Muslims and Mormons: A Social Identity Theory Approach, 2 POL. & 
RELIGION 277, 287 (2009) (reporting on a study showing that “evangelical Protestants in the 
United States tend to hold particularly negative views of Muslims”). 
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Third, just as Muslims began to rise in significant numbers and to 
positions of prominence in the United States, Islamic-extremist-inspired 
terrorism has become a serious threat to national and international security. 
Even as they write encouragingly about finding meaningful accommodations 
for Muslim religious tenets within the context of American constitutionalism 
and political liberalism, Professors John Witte and Joel Nichols warn of set-
backs due to a “cultural backlash against Muslims prompted by 9/11, 7/7, 
Fort Hood, or the bloody and unpopular wars against Islamicist extremists in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond.”110 Based on our empirical study of federal 
court religious-liberty decisions, we fear that religious liberty may become a 
casualty of that cultural backlash.111 
We should emphasize that our study focused on religious-liberty claims 
in court. While our readers will be aware of troubling developments in other 
dimensions of American life, our findings are grounded in data from a 
particular time period before judges of the lower federal courts. At the same 
time, we believe that trends in the judicial reception of religious-liberty 
claims flow back into society and influence societal attitudes.112 Moreover, 
the impartial and even-handed treatment of claimants by judges, regardless 
of religious identity, is a cardinal value in itself. Thus, judicial responses to 
claims for Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation in the federal courts 
comprise an important chapter in the modern story of American religious 
liberty. 
B. ALTERNATIVE THEORIES FOR THE MUSLIM DISADVANTAGE IN RELIGIOUS-LIBERTY 
CASES 
We discuss below four alternative theories to explain—or, in one 
instance, explain away—our finding that Muslim claimants suffer a 
significant and powerful disadvantage in presenting religious-liberty claims 
to the lower federal courts: 
First, as the “Minority Religion Disadvantage” thesis, we consider the 
possible impact of a general cultural antipathy toward Islam as yet another 
minority religion outside the modern American triumvirate of 
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism. 
Second, as the “Culture War” thesis, we discuss the growing secularism 
in certain sectors of society, along with opposition to groups holding 
traditional religious values. Because most American Muslims maintain what 
are conventionally seen as conservative views on many social issues, we 
 
 110. John Witte, Jr. & Joel A. Nichols, Faith-Based Family Laws in Western Democracies?, 2010 
FIDES ET LIBERTAS 122, 126–27, available at http://www.irla.org/assets/files/Fides/Fides2 
010.pdf. 
 111. See infra Parts IV.B.4 & V. 
 112. See Marie A. Failinger, Islam in the Mind of American Courts: 1800 to 1960, 32 B.C. J.L. & 
SOC. JUST. 1, 2 (2012) (“The courts can both reflect American social attitudes and shape them, 
countering misperceptions and stereotypes that result in social and legal harm to minorities.”). 
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consider the possibility that negative responses to Muslim religious-liberty 
claims may be generated by the wider “Culture War” on social and moral 
controversies that persists in American social and political discourse. 
Third, as the “Muslims Deserve To Lose” thesis, we evaluate the 
possibility that claims made by Muslims are distinctively weaker on their 
merits and thus deserve to be rejected at a higher rate than claims made by 
those from other religious communities. 
Fourth, as the “Islam Viewed as Dangerous” thesis, which we believe is 
the most likely explanation for the Muslim disadvantage, we describe the 
fears harbored by many Americans that followers of Islam pose a security 
danger to the United States, especially in an era of terrorist anxiety. We 
further explain that these negative perceptions of Islam and its followers in 
America bear little resemblance to reality. 
Then, in the next Part of the Article, we suggest that the persistent 
uneasiness of many Americans about Islam and its followers appears to have 
filtered into the attitudes of such well-educated and independent elites as 
federal judges. 
1. The “Minority Religion Disadvantage” Thesis 
The conventional wisdom has been that adherents to minority religions 
are more likely to fail when pressing religious-liberty claims in court, while 
followers of mainstream Christianity are more likely to succeed. Given the 
history of discrimination and persecution against religious minorities, 
scholars have understandably believed that “the scales generally tip in favor 
of Judeo-Christian beliefs, and against those outside that framework.”113 
In our prior 1986–1995 study, we did not find that followers of minority 
religions generally were significantly less likely to secure a favorable hearing 
from federal judges.114 In fact, counter to the popular narrative, we found 
that adherents to traditionalist Christian faiths, notably Catholics and 
Baptists, entered the courthouse doors at a distinct disadvantage.115 And 
now, in the present 1996–2005 study, Muslims are nearly alone in suffering 
a disadvantage in religious-liberty litigation. The only exception involves 
claims by adherents to small black-separatist sects, some three-quarters of 
which arose in the context of criminal proceedings and prisons, where racial 
tensions can pose security threats for both correctional officers and other 
prisoners.116 
 
 113. Verna C. Sánchez, All Roads Are Good: Beyond the Lexicon of Christianity in Free Exercise 
Jurisprudence, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 35 n.12 (1997). 
 114. Sisk, supra note 17, at 1033–37; Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 562–67. 
 115. See supra note 114. 
 116. See Heise & Sisk, Religion Before the Bench, supra note 17, at 17. On the regression results 
for and the coding of Black Separatists, see supra Table 1 and notes 69–70 and accompanying 
text. 
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Professor William Marshall once argued that “[a] court is more likely to 
find against a claimant on definitional grounds when the religion is bizarre, 
relative to the cultural norm, and is more likely to find that a religious belief 
is insincere when the belief in question is, by cultural norms, 
incredulous.”117 One of us has “submit[ted] something of the opposite may 
be as common . . . given the natural human tendency to respond more 
vigorously to the perceived threat next door than to the peculiarity on the 
far side of town”118: 
Because such unconventional thinking or conduct is so distant 
from our own, and because the actors are so remote from our own 
world and experiences, we are less likely to compare those attitudes 
and actions against our own beliefs and practices . . . . Nor are we 
likely to feel threatened, again precisely because the perspective 
involved is so alien and thus so far removed from our day-to-day 
life.119 
Thus, when a judge hearing a religious-liberty case encounters what he or 
she sees as a novel or eccentric religious exercise by a follower of a peculiar 
religion, that judge may be more willing to direct tolerance of that religious 
practice as perhaps unusual, but harmless and easily accommodated. 
Moreover, when the believer is part of a small minority religion, we 
anticipate that exceptions and accommodations can be more easily 
contained with minimal impact. In sum, Free Exercise accommodations to 
small, minority religions do not occasion much, if any, real inconvenience to 
the majority. 
By contrast, when a religion no longer is alien and remote, but instead 
is regularly encountered, societal forbearance may be lifted for the practices 
of that religion that diverge from majoritarian customs and preferences. 
Thus, one of us has argued, “the typical American may be more threatened by 
that which is familiar and close at hand, but regarded as morally reprehensible, 
than by that which is foreign and remote (culturally if not geographically).”120 In 
addition, when the followers of that faith increase in numbers, the sincerity of the 
majority’s commitment to religious tolerance is put to the test. In those 
circumstances, religious liberty is not merely a high-minded ideal but begins to 
have real costs. 
For many decades, as Professor John Esposito reminds us, “Islam had 
remained invisible on the cognitive maps of most Americans.”121 But today, 
 
 117. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
308, 311 (1991). 
 118. Sisk, supra note 17, at 1042. 
 119. Id. at 1042–43. 
 120. Id. at 1043. 
 121. John L. Esposito, Foreword to MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra 
note 61, at xi. 
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“Islam and Muslims represent the second largest religion in Europe and the 
third in North America.”122 
Accordingly, the emergence of Muslims in larger numbers and with greater 
prominence in American life is more likely to explain their impaired success in 
seeking religious accommodation than the simple fact that they are a minority 
and non-Judeo-Christian religion. Indeed, if being a follower of a minority 
religion alone was sufficient to undermine the prospects for a religious-liberty 
claim, we would expect to find that Jehovah’s Witnesses, practitioners of Native 
American religions, and others encountered similar difficulties. But in our 
primary models, save for Muslims and Black Separatists, no other religious-
grouping variable reached, or even approached, a similarly negative statistical 
significance. In fact, as discussed in more detail in a companion Article, we 
found that claimants from two minority religious groups—Rastafarians and 
Buddhists—appeared to be more likely to succeed in bringing Religious Free 
Exercise/Accommodation claims, although we expressed doubts about the 
reliability of those findings.123 
In sum, American Muslims appear to be at a pronounced disadvantage in 
obtaining accommodations for religious practices in federal court because they are 
Muslims, and not because they fall into a broader category of adherents to 
minority religions. The unequal judicial treatment is felt by the members of this 
particular faith group, distinct from others. The crucial question remains as to 
what it is about the perceptions of Islam held by other Americans that is seen to 
justify excluding American Muslims from fully enjoying the benefits of religious 
accommodations that are extended to persons of other faiths. 
2. The “Culture War: Traditionalist v. Secularist” Thesis 
a. From 1986 to 1995: Traditionalist Christians Less Likely To Succeed in 
Religious-Liberty Cases 
In our prior study of religious-liberty decisions dating from 1986 to 
1995, we found that adherents to traditionalist religions, specifically Roman 
Catholics and Baptists, were significantly less likely to succeed in seeking 
religious accommodations in the federal courts.124 Based on those results, 
“we suggest[ed] that the phenomenon of impaired success for claimants from 
these two religious communities may [best] be understood as part of what 
Thomas Berg describes as ‘a broader distrust of politically active social 
conservatives,’ which now includes both Catholics and evangelical Protestants.”125 
When orthodox Catholics and traditionalist Baptists, adhering to 
conservative social values and moral principles, resisted, for example, 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. Heise & Sisk, Religion Before the Bench, supra note 17, at 21–25. 
 124. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 564–66; Sisk, supra note 17, at 1037–38. 
 125. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 565 (quoting Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism 
and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 122 (2001)). 
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government regulation of private schools or the application of gay rights 
ordinances in certain metropolitan areas, such claims “tend[] to be a shot right 
across the bow of the secular ship of state.”126 Given that federal judges are drawn 
from the cultural elite, they may react with greater skepticism to claims by 
traditionalist Christians that raise familiar and controversial social and cultural 
challenges to the social-policy initiatives of secularist governments, especially in 
metropolitan areas which tend to lean liberal socially. 
So now, with the benefit of additional empirical evidence from our 
latest study of decisions from 1996–2005, has the continuing national 
controversy over the nature and scope of religious liberty evolved into what 
one of us has called “a new conflict between the agenda of a liberal secular 
elite and the practices and values of traditional religious believers”?127 And 
should a now more visible Islam join the ranks of the traditionalist American 
faiths that find themselves engaged in a cultural war with liberal and 
secularist political movements? 
b. Muslim American Attitudes on Moral Values, Religion in Public Life, and 
Politics 
As with Christianity and Judaism, Islam and its American followers are 
heterogeneous and multi-faceted. Any attempt to capsulize the nature of 
that faith and its followers in theology, religious practice, political ideology, 
and social attitudes will unavoidably mischaracterize by inevitable over-
generalization. As Professors Matt A. Barreto and Dino N. Bozonelos remind 
us, Muslim Americans are “extremely diverse” in race, religious sect, 
language, nation of origin, and history within the United States.128 
Still, as with Christianity and Judaism, certain central tenets and 
common practices do draw together the broad sweep of those who believe in 
Islam, at least in its more orthodox form. Moreover, as Professor Aminah 
Beverly McCloud writes, given the challenges that the Islamic community 
encountered in the aftermath of 9/11, both newer (mostly immigrant) and 
older (native-born) American Muslims in their various communities are 
“coming together” with greater appreciation for each other and a 
heightened recognition of the need for community discourse and common 
understanding.129 Islamic studies scholar Zafar Ishaq Ansari believes “there 
are strong reasons to expect an enhanced cohesiveness among American 
Muslims in the future.”130 Importantly, when evaluating the dominant 
American perception of Islam and its adherents—which, in turn, may shed 
light on why Muslims may be disadvantaged in asserting religious-liberty 
 
 126. Sisk, supra note 17, at 1045. 
 127. Id. at 1024. 
 128. Matt A. Barreto & Dino N. Bozonelos, Democrat, Republican, or None of the Above? The 
Role of Religiosity in Muslim American Party Identification, 2 POL. & RELIGION 200, 211 (2009). 
 129. McCloud, supra note 62, at 82–83. 
 130. Ansari, supra note 61, at 261. 
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claims—those unifying Islamic themes (or, more accurately, perceptions of 
those themes) take center stage. 
Many Muslim immigrants over the past two decades, especially those 
from the Middle East and South Asia, have come from and have retained 
their religiously traditionalist cultures.131 African Americans, constituting 
nearly one-third of American Muslims,132 are even more likely to hold to 
conservative religious and moral precepts.133 
Based on a 2007 survey by the Pew Research Center, a substantial 
majority of American Muslims (61%) believed that society should 
discourage homosexuality,134 although that number fell to less than half 
(45%) in a 2011 survey.135 An earlier 2001 poll found that substantial 
majorities of American Muslims opposed same-sex marriage (71%), 
approved greater restrictions on abortion (57%), and supported stricter 
regulation of pornography (65%).136 Majorities of Muslims also supported 
prayer and display of the Ten Commandments in public schools.137 As with 
Christians and Jews,138 more religiously active Muslims are even more 
conservative in social and moral values.139 
Muslim Americans also generally support a vigorous public role for 
religiously grounded moral teachings, although they are more evenly 
divided on the proper role of religious institutions in the political realm. As 
the Pew Research Center reported in its 2007 survey, 59% of Muslim 
Americans believed the government should play a stronger role in 
protecting morality, while only 29% take the opposing position.140 Yet, by a 
49% to 43% margin, Muslims believed their mosques should stay out of 
politics.141 With respect to this divide, native-born Muslim-Americans, and 
 
 131. See Jalalzai, supra note 64, at 165. 
 132. Id. at 166. 
 133. See 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 45 (“[N]ative-born African 
American Muslims stand out for their particularly high levels of opposition to homosexuality 
(75% say homosexuality should be discouraged).”). 
 134. Id. at 7. 
 135. 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 103, at 59. 
 136. Ali A. Mazrui, Muslims Between the Jewish Example and the Black Experience, in MUSLIMS’ 
PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 117, 143 n.23 (citing American Muslim 
Poll: November/December 2001, ZOGBY INT’L (Dec. 19, 2001),  http://www.amp.ghazali.net/Zogby 
_Poll_Dec_2001-000.htm). 
 137. Id. 
 138. ANDREW KOHUT ET AL., THE DIMINISHING DIVIDE: RELIGION’S CHANGING ROLE IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 4 (2000); William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 
UMKC L. REV. 307, 308 (2008). 
 139. See 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 45–46; 2011 PEW MUSLIM 
AMERICANS, supra note 103, at 59–60. 
 140. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 45–46. 
 141. Id. at 46. 
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especially African-American Muslims, more strongly supported expression 
on the political issues of the day by mosques.142 
As Muslims become full-fledged participants in American democracy 
while still retaining their Islamic identity, they will almost surely be another 
voice for a healthy religious presence in the public square.143 As a matter of 
both Islamic history and religious teaching, religion and government have 
long been intertwined,144 as is historically true of other religions. As 
Professor Faisal Kutty puts it, “Islam envisions no separation between the 
temporal and the spiritual.”145 Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, President of the 
Minaret of Freedom Institute, introduces what he acknowledges is a “novel, 
and therefore controversial” argument in Muslim circles for the dis-
establishment of religion in sectors of public life.146 At the same time, 
Ahmad emphasizes that “religion and politics cannot and should not be 
completely separated,” arguing that “citizens in a democratic government 
can and should bring their religious sensibilities to their positions on the 
issues.”147 
For Christians and Jews in the United States, a higher level of religious 
engagement is likewise associated with more conservative or traditional views 
on social and moral matters.148 But while religiously active Christians and 
Jews are much more likely to affiliate with the Republican Party in national 
politics,149 a substantial majority of American Muslims now identify 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Professor Stephen Carter has defended the religious voice in the public square, 
complaining that “we often ask our citizens to split their public and private selves, telling them 
in effect that it is fine to be religious in private, but there is something askew when those private 
beliefs become the basis for public action.” STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: 
HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 8 (1993). As the late 
Richard John Neuhaus wrote, “The alternative to the naked public square is not the sacred 
public square; it is the civil public square.” Richard J. Neuhaus, Rebuilding the Civil Public Square, 
44 LOY. L. REV. 119, 132 (1998). 
 144. Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad, American and Muslim Perspectives on Freedom of Religion, 8 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 355, 363 (2006) (stating that “the notion of entanglement of state and religion in 
Muslim history” has been well “entrenched”); see also L. Ali Khan, The Qur’an and the 
Constitution, 85 TUL. L. REV. 161, 168 (2010) (“[T]he Qur’an does establish a spiritual 
normative order under which all systemic norms are subjected to God’s authority as embodied 
in the Qur’an.”). 
 145. Faisal Kutty, The Myth and Reality of “Shari’a Courts” in Canada: A Delayed Opportunity for 
the Indigenization of Islamic Legal Rulings, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 577 (2010). 
 146. Ahmad, supra note 144, at 364. 
 147. Id. 
 148. For more on the emergence of a devotional divide between Republicans and 
Democrats, see generally Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1231–38. 
 149. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE SURVEY: 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND PRACTICES: DIVERSE AND POLITICALLY RELEVANT 19 (2008), available at 
http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf (“Across a variety 
of religious traditions, those who say that religion is very important in their lives, express a more 
certain belief in God, or pray or attend worship services more frequently tend to be much more 
conservative in their political outlook and more Republican in their party affiliation.”). 
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themselves as Democrats, with only about 10% describing themselves as 
Republicans.150 
Because of widespread opposition by American Muslims to both the 
foreign policy of the Bush Administration following September 11, 2001, 
and the war in Iraq, as well as stronger support for government social 
welfare programs, Muslims have shifted from supporting Republican 
candidates to Democratic candidates in the last two presidential election 
cycles.151 
While most Americans tend to be conservative or liberal on both social 
and governmental policies, Professor Farida Jalalzai cites the 2007 Pew 
Research Center Report in concluding that Muslim Americans “are relatively 
unique compared to the general population in their high degrees of 
liberalism on social welfare while being very conservative on issues of 
morality such as gay rights.”152 In fact, precisely because their perspectives on 
various issues do not neatly fit the platforms of either party, and even while 
majorities of Muslims have voted for Democratic presidential candidates, a 
large proportion of Muslims resist affiliation with either political party.153 
While devout Christians and Jews are more likely to affiliate with the 
Republican Party,154 a focused survey finds that “Muslims who follow the 
[Qur’an] and Hadith very much in their daily life are over 30% more likely 
to select no political party as their partisan identification.”155 
Despite this difference in political leanings, socially conservative 
Muslims may encounter the same resistance from the liberal and secularist 
side of the cultural divide as have conservative Christians and Jews. As 
Professor Azizah al-Hibri writes, “a Muslim is committed to an integrated 
worldview,” thus rejecting the “compartmentalization theory” which confines 
religious faith to private life and excludes religiously based values from 
public life.156 By contrast, “[t]he new sense of secularization is not neutral 
among religions,” says al-Hibri, “but rather averse to them.”157 Writing 
specifically about intellectual movements, Professor Sherman Jackson 
predicts that Black Muslim Americans are especially likely “to promote a 
 
 150. 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 103, at 53 (reporting that 70% of U.S. 
Muslims identify as Democrats, with only 11% as Republicans); 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, 
supra note 59, at 7 (reporting that 63% of U.S. Muslims identify as Democrats, with only 11% as 
Republicans); 2009 GALLUP MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 20 (reporting 49% of Muslim 
Americans identify as Democrats, with only 8% as Republicans). 
 151. Barreto & Bozonelos, supra note 128, at 204–05. 
 152. Jalalzai, supra note 64, at 183. 
 153. Barreto & Bozonelos, supra note 128, at 220. 
 154. Sisk & Heise, Establishment Clause Decisions, supra note 17, at 1233–36. 
 155. Barreto & Bozonelos, supra note 128, at 220. 
 156. al-Hibri, supra note 99, at 1134, 1136. 
 157. Id. at 1131. 
A5 - SISKHEISE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2012  12:13 PM 
2012] MUSLIMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 267 
more critical stance . . . vis-à-vis the secularizing tendencies of Western 
thought.”158 
In sum, to borrow Professor Stephen Carter’s metaphor, like evangelical 
Christians, traditional Catholics, and Orthodox Jews, religiously devout 
Muslims refuse to treat their religion “as a hobby.”159 As with many other 
religiously devout Americans, Muslims will instead conform their behavior to 
their faith and allow their faith to inform their views on matters of public 
concern. 
c. From 1996 to 2005: The Traditionalist Christian Disadvantage Disappears 
In our prior study of decisions from 1986 to 1995, as we noted, 
Catholics and Baptists were less successful than members of other religions 
in raising religious free-exercise claims in federal court.160 We attributed this 
result to a greater tendency by traditionalist Christian claimants to resist 
application of various social welfare regulations and anti-discrimination laws to 
church-related institutions.161 Catholic and Baptist objections to application of 
employment discrimination laws against religious colleges, schools, and other 
institutions; Catholic entities’ resistance to application of labor bargaining laws; 
and Baptist challenges to safety and health regulation and other licensing of 
religious schools were among the most common claims.162 During this period, 
judges tended to view such regulatory measures and civil rights laws as serving 
especially compelling public interests.163 
Interestingly, however, the apparent difficulty in raising free-exercise 
claims that we observed among Catholics and Baptists in the 1986–1995 
study has faded away to statistical insignificance in the present 1996–2005 
study. 
In this present study, we added another Case Type variable for claims 
asserting Exemption from Anti-Discrimination Laws, which accounted for 4.4% 
of the claims in our Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation data set. That new 
variable proved statistically significant at nearly the p < .001 (or 99.9% 
probability) level and in a positive direction. The substantive effect of the 
Exemption from Anti-Discrimination Laws variable was also powerful. When all 
other independent variables are held constant, the predicted probability 
that a religious organization would succeed before an individual judge on an 
exemption claim was 74.6%, while parties in other Religious Free 
 
 158. Sherman A. Jackson, Preliminary Reflections on Islam and Black Religion, in MUSLIMS’ 
PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 201, 217. 
 159. See CARTER, supra note 143, at 29. 
 160. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 564. 
 161. Sisk, supra note 17, at 1045. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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Exercise/Accommodation cases were likely to succeed at a rate of only 
33.6%.164 
Between 1996 and 2005, the federal courts of appeals affirmed—and 
most extended—the longstanding “ministerial exception” to anti-
discrimination laws, while also broadly construing statutory exceptions for 
religious employers.165 Grounded in the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the ministerial exception precludes lawsuits challenging 
a religious organization’s choice of employees who perform religious 
functions, including the primary minister, priest, rabbi, or imam, and 
increasingly other employees with religious worship or religious teaching 
responsibilities.166 
In Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, decided 
in early 2012, the Supreme Court confirmed the constitutional foundation 
of the ministerial exception, holding that it precluded an employment 
discrimination suit against a religious school by a teacher who had the title 
and responsibilities of a minister.167 Although the majority stated that the 
“ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation” 
and that a “rigid formula” should not be applied, the Court did not clearly 
indicate the scope of the exception as applied to other employees of a 
religious organization who are not formally commissioned as ministers.168 
Accordingly, with the solidification and frequent expansion of the 
ministerial exception in the lower federal courts between 1996 and 2005, 
traditionalist religious organizations that were accused of discriminatory 
employment practices were no longer at a disadvantage. For that reason 
alone, perhaps, the poor prospects of traditionalist Christians that we 
observed in our prior study have seemingly disappeared. 
 
 164. For further discussion of traditionalist Christians as claimants and the Exemption from 
Anti-Discrimination Laws Case Type variable, see Heise & Sisk, Religion Before the Bench, supra 
note 17, at 24–27. 
 165. Each of the following cases was included in our data set: Werft v. Desert Sw. Annual 
Conference of the United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2004); Shaliehsabou v. 
Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299 (4th Cir. 2004); Bryce v. Episcopal Church 
in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002); Hall v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care 
Corp., 215 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 
F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); Starkman v. Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999); Killinger v. 
Samford Univ., 113 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Ticali v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 41 F. Supp. 2d 249 (E.D.N.Y. 
1999); see also Christopher C. Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1, 21 
(2011) (“As it stands now, every federal circuit has adopted some form of the ministerial 
exception, with the exception of the Federal Circuit (which has no jurisdiction over such 
cases).”). 
 166. See Gregory A. Kalscheur, Civil Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the 
Ministerial Exception, Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church, 17 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 43, 48–49 (2008). 
 167. Hosanna–Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705–10 
(2012). 
 168. Id. at 707. 
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d. No Evidence that the Muslim Disadvantage Is Due to Traditionalist Nature of 
Islam 
Might our finding that Muslims alone now suffer a meaningful 
disadvantage in asserting Religious Free Exercise claims indicate that a 
cultural antipathy to traditionalist religions has emerged in another context? 
In terms of resistance to liberal secular social policy, have Muslims become 
the new Catholics and Baptists? Given the nature of religious-liberty cases 
involving Muslim claimants, we do not believe the evidence from our 
present study can support that conclusion. 
Although the claims by Muslims for recognition of their religious free-
exercise rights do arise in a variety of contexts in our data set, including 
challenges to regulations, assertion of free-expression rights, zoning 
disputes, and employment discrimination, nearly three-quarters (74.7%) of 
the observations involving Muslims in our data set are claims by prisoners. 
Prisoner claims do not raise the kinds of challenges to secular social welfare 
and anti-discrimination laws that present a direct conflict with traditional 
moral teachings as did the claims of Baptists and Catholics that we examined 
in our prior study. Non-prisoner claims by Muslims, of which the largest 
share are employment discrimination cases against the federal government, 
did not consistently involve the kinds of disputes that bring traditionalist 
beliefs into conflict with government regulations or equality directives. 
Indeed, in contrast with the continued frequency of claims by traditionalist 
Christians for exemption from anti-discrimination laws, not a single one of 
the Muslim claims in this study fell into that category. 
In the final analysis, then, the so-called “Culture War” between religious 
traditionalists and secular liberals did not connect with the types of religious-
liberty claims being presented by Muslims to the federal courts in our study. 
The traditionalist moral beliefs of Muslims may well clash with liberal 
secularism and may impair their claims for religious liberty in other political 
settings or judicial venues.169 Or perhaps Muslims will escape from being 
recruited into one side or the other in the ongoing “Culture War.” 
In any event, the great majority of Muslim claims in our study cannot be 
categorized as conflicts between traditionalist values and secular public 
policies. Whether or not Muslim integration into American society is 
affected by general controversies over social and moral issues, our study 
provides no evidence of any such effect in federal religious-liberty litigation. 
 
 169. See generally Daniel O. Conkle, Religious Truth, Pluralism, and Secularization: The Shaking 
Foundations of American Religious Liberty, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755, 1779 (2011) (arguing that 
religious liberty generally “is being slowly eroded by the forces of secularization and by the 
decline of traditional religious understandings,” because the strong “religious-moral foundation 
of religious liberty” has been undermined and the weaker “political-pragmatic justification for 
religious liberty” may “lead to a far less generous regime of religious liberty and, eventually, the 
complete demise of religious liberty as a distinctive constitutional or legal right”). 
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3. The “Muslims Deserve To Lose” Thesis 
Religious communities have contrasting doctrines, promote diverse 
theological and moral values, have different expectations for their members, 
and generate a variety of conflicts with government entities and rules. 
Perhaps, one reasonably might inquire, Muslim claimants lose at a 
disproportionate rate in the lower federal courts because their particular 
claims of Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation are simply weaker or 
different in nature than those presented by members of other religious 
communities. In other words, one might postulate that to compare the 
success of Muslim claimants to, say, Catholic or Native American claimants, 
is to compare apples and oranges, such that disparities in outcome rates 
have no substantive meaning and tell us nothing about judges or their 
attitudes toward religious groups. 
The ideal study of judicial decision-makers would examine the identical 
case or specific question being simultaneously decided by a large set of 
judicial actors. Such a natural experiment rarely presents itself in the real 
world.170 Instead, nearly all empirical studies of courts and judges involve 
large data sets of judicial rulings that encompass a multitude of different 
cases, each of which presents circumstances, parties, arguments, and 
dynamics that are to some extent unique to that case. 
If that unavoidable starting point for empirical examination of judicial 
decision-making disqualifies such studies, then nearly every attempt to 
explore judicial behavior by quantitative measures simply dies aborning. 
Some critics of the empirical study of judicial decision-making undoubtedly 
would endorse that diagnosis of still-birth. We think the better response is to 
do what is possible in planning and conducting an empirical study of judges 
or courts to anticipate, measure, and control for meaningful differences 
among the cases and decisions under study, while acknowledging the limits 
and uncertainties inherent in such a study. Researchers then should conduct 
follow-up and alternative studies to see if findings in one study are 
confirmed or undermined by other studies. 
Moreover, with respect to the merits of each case, the kinds of disputes 
that are resolved by a written opinion by a federal judge typically involve 
plausible claims and defenses by each side. Precisely in such circumstances, 
statistical analysis of a larger set of decisions provides the opportunity to 
search for patterns that might not be discernible in the individual case and 
influences that may not be conscious to an individual decision-maker. 
 
 170. We have been fortunate in the past to study “such a natural laboratory, or something 
quite close to it,” when “[t]he equivalent of a single case was presented to hundreds of federal 
district court judges” who had to resolve constitutional challenges to the new federal sentencing 
guidelines system in 1988. Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the 
Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 
1381 (1998). Such an opportunity, however, may come only once in a researcher’s lifetime. 
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Uncovering such patterns by piercing through a fog of multiple factors and 
variables is one of the great values of empirical research. 
In the present study, several factors mitigate (but can never entirely 
eliminate) the risk that we are comparing apples and oranges to no 
productive end: First, as noted, our study examines only digested written 
opinions by federal district and court of appeals judges. If the followers of a 
specific religious tradition are prone to present frivolous claims, those 
should be weeded out before reaching the stage where the judge has issued 
a written ruling. For this reason, among the set of non-frivolous claims for 
religious free exercise and accommodation that result in a written opinion, 
if Muslims still fare worse than other claimants, as we have found in this 
study, then something other than obvious lack of merit presumably explains 
the result.171 
Second, both this and our prior study of religious-liberty decisions 
include a set of written decisions spanning a full decade. The effect of 
episodic but short-lived trends in religious-liberty litigation and the type of 
claims made should dissipate over the course of that time period. By 
including a larger number of cases for analysis over a longer time sweep, the 
idiosyncratic elements of any peculiar or atypical case should be submerged 
into the greater mass of rulings and variables. 
Third, to the extent that Muslim claimants tended to litigate as 
individuals, while many other religious-liberty claims were brought by 
institutions, we adjusted the model in the present study to separate out that 
effect by adding a dummy “Institutional Religious Claimant” variable. 
Churches, dioceses, parishes, synagogues, mosques, religious-affiliated 
hospitals and universities, and other religious organizations were coded as 
institutional claimants. In this way, we control in part for the perhaps greater 
credibility and community standing of religious organizations, as well as 
their presumably greater access to litigation resources, which also may result 
in better framing of institutional claims through superior legal 
representation.172 
Religious groups represented in our study varied greatly on whether 
claims were presented to the courts predominately by institutions or by 
individuals. More than three-quarters (75.5%) of claims by Mainline 
 
 171. See Pat K. Chew & Luke T. Kelley-Chew, The Missing Minority Judges, 14 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 179, 186–87 (2010) (rejecting “The Simple Explanation” that the poor success rate for 
Asian-American plaintiffs in racial harassment cases is because “Asian-American plaintiffs have 
weak cases on the merits,” observing that the procedural and legal obstacles to bringing a case 
to disposition in litigation likely means that “cases that reach this stage of litigation would be 
strong rather than weak on the merits”). 
 172. Some legal scholars have called for a “more institution-sensitive understanding of the 
Religion Clauses,” Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding 
of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 291 (2008), and have asked whether “religious 
entities occupy a distinctive place in our constitutional order,” Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The 
Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37, 92 (2002). 
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Protestants and more than one-third (36.9%) of claims by Catholics were 
brought by institutions, whereas the vast majority of claims by Muslims 
(97.8%) and Native Americans (93.2%) were brought by individual 
believers. In our primary model, the Religious Institutional Claimant 
variable was significant and in the positive direction as hypothesized, 
although the variable was not marginally significant in the secondary model 
or the alternative models using party as a proxy for judicial ideology. Still, 
given that we included the variable as a control to account in part for the 
effects of organizational support and litigation resources, separate from the 
religious identity of claimants, these results confirm the wisdom of adding 
such a control variable to our model. 
Finally, we included case-type control variables to ensure that any 
relationship observed was not an artifact of a particular type of case. As 
Professors Donald Songer and Susan Tabrizi explain, “integrated models will 
be incompletely specified unless they include the particular case facts that 
are most relevant for the type of cases examined.”173 
Because 74.7% of the claims raised by Muslims in our data set arose in 
the prison context, some will understandably wonder whether the litigation 
disadvantage we discovered is attributable to this particular case type as a 
proxy for merit-deficit. Some might be tempted to dismiss our study as 
simply replicating in larger numbers the traditional inhospitality of the 
courts to “a Muslims-in-prison case.”174 
In Cutter v. Wilkinson, involving a prisoner claim under the Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, the Supreme Court noted that 
Congress “anticipated that courts would apply the Act’s standard [for 
evaluating burdens on religious practice] with ‘due deference to the 
experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing 
necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and 
discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.’”175 
Thus, under one possible categorical approach to the often conflicting 
themes in Supreme Court religious-liberty doctrine, prisoner claims may fit 
into those “clusters of cases dealing with failed free exercise claims.”176 
For several reasons, conjectures about the lack of merit to religious-
liberty claims by prisoners in general, and by Muslims in particular, are 
 
 173. Donald R. Songer & Susan J. Tabrizi, The Religious Right in Court: The Decision Making of 
Christian Evangelicals in State Supreme Courts, 61 J. POL. 507, 511 (1999). 
 174. See Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 
1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 261 (admonishing that “a long line of Supreme Court decisions 
rejecting free exercise claims could each be satisfactorily explained to most Americans by simply 
referencing the appropriate buzz words,” including “a Muslims-in-prison case” (citing O’Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987))). 
 175. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (quoting 146 CONG. REC. 16,698, 
16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy)). 
 176. WITTE, supra note 87, at 146–47. 
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belied by the empirical evidence. As we found in both this and our prior 
study, prisoner claims in general are not less likely to succeed in court, at 
least if those cases persevere to final written decisions. Moreover, the type of 
claims typically raised by Muslim prisoners in our study—for prayer space or 
dietary accommodation177—do not implicate special security or penological 
concerns. 
Most importantly, even controlling for the “prisoner effect”—the 
supposition that claims by prisoners are likely to be perceived as less 
meritorious—by removing all prisoner cases from the study, the Muslim 
disadvantage remains significant in Religious Free Exercise/ 
Accommodation claims. In sum, prisoner cases are not driving the impaired 
success of Muslim claimants in religious-liberty cases. 
Given the unique setting of a prison, the special security concerns of 
prison administrators and guards, the potentially dangerous nature of 
prisoners, and the necessary loss of freedom that follows a criminal 
conviction, one might understandably expect that judges would approach 
prisoner claims with greater skepticism and thus that the success rate of 
prisoners in requesting religious accommodations would be low. But despite 
arguments for treating prisoner claims more skeptically and extending 
greater deference to prison administration in regulating prison life, the 
lower federal courts in written decisions do not appear to reject prisoner 
claims at a higher rate than other types of religious-liberty claims. 
In our prior 1986–1995 study, while 35.6% of Religious Free 
Exercise/Accommodation claimants overall were favorably received by judges, 
the success rate among prisoners on such claims was higher, at 40.2%—a 
difference in outcome rate that was not statistically significant.178 Moreover, when 
we conducted a focused regression analysis excluding all prisoner cases, the 
results remained remarkably similar to those from the primary model.179 
For the 1996–2005 study, the success rate of prisoners of all religious 
affiliations (most of whom were not Muslims) asserting Religious Free 
Exercise/Accommodation claims was 33.0%. When compared to the overall 
success rate of 35.5% for claimants in all case types, the slightly lower success 
rate for prisoner claims was, again, statistically insignificant. 
In sum, in raising Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation claims, 
prisoners did not face greater resistance from the federal courts, at least in 
our data set of cases resulting in a written decision. Indeed, in our current 
study, the Prisoner case-type category control variable is statistically 
significant (p < .01 or the 99% probability level) in a positive direction. Thus, 
 
 177. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ENFORCING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN PRISON 23 
(2008) [hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS PRISON REPORT], available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/ 
STAT2008ERFIP.pdf (reporting that religious diet claims were 44.4% of religious grievances 
filed administratively in federal prisons, while 55.5% involved access to religious programs). 
 178. Sisk, Heise & Morriss, supra note 17, at 561. 
 179. Id. 
A5 - SISKHEISE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2012  12:13 PM 
274 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:231 
our results do not suggest that, in general, prisoner claimants are 
predetermined to fail—rather, we find that incarcerated Muslim claimants 
are the true losers. 
One might next query whether Muslims as a class of prisoners are 
rightly treated differently, for reasons of substance rather than their mere 
religious identity. Perhaps, some might suggest, the dominant Muslim sects 
in prison culture may be more dangerous or preach violence and hatred, 
thereby justifying tighter penal restrictions for legitimate security reasons. 
Over the past decade, the nation has become increasingly aware that 
extremist groups, from racial supremacists and right-wing anti-government 
groups to radical environmentalists, have established a foothold within 
prisons and seek to recruit prisoners to their various causes.180 Some fear 
that radical Islamic groups tied to international terrorism have succeeded in 
recruiting inmates to their extremist brand of Islam.181 Reports warn that 
inmates leading worship, without supervision by trained Islamic chaplains, 
“preach[] a breed of ‘Prison Islam’ that distorts Koranic teaching to 
promote violence and gang loyalty.”182 Others, however, including the 
leader of the prison chaplains’ organization, argue that “reports of prisons 
being infiltrated by terrorists or terrorist organizations via prison religious 
programs . . . have been blown way out of proportion.”183 
While the presence of extremist sects of Islam in prison cannot be 
denied, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice 
reported in 2004 that 85% of Muslims in federal prison are Sunni or NOI184 
and did not find that a substantial number of these are attracted to 
Wahhabism (an extreme and exclusionary branch of Islam linked by some 
to terrorism).185 Federal prison chaplains predicted that “strict Wahhabism 
would not survive in prisons because it is too exclusionary to appeal to the 
 
 180. ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, DANGEROUS CONVICTIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES IN PRISONS 5–6 (2002), available at http://www.adl.org/learn/ext_terr/ 
dangerous_convictions.pdf. 
 181. Waller Testimony, supra note 106. 
 182. Primary Sources: “Prison Islam,” ATLANTIC (Sept. 2004), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/magazine/archive/2004/09/primary-sources/303427/. 
 183. Terrorism: Radical Islamic Influence of Chaplaincy of the U.S. Military and Prisons: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. (2003) (testimony of Paul E. Rogers, President, American Correctional Chaplains 
Association), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing-search.cfm (select 
hearing year “2003” and search witness testimony for “Rogers”; then follow “Mr. Paul Rogers” 
hyperlink). 
 184. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF PRISONS’ SELECTION OF MUSLIM RELIGIOUS SERVICES PROVIDERS 5 (2004) 
[hereinafter OIG REVIEW], available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0404/final.pdf. 
 185. See Stephen Seymour, Note, The Silence of Prayer: An Examination of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons’ Moratorium on the Hiring of Muslim Chaplains, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 523, 527–28 
(2006). 
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inmates.”186 A senior official from the Federal Bureau of Prisons “said that 
he does not believe there is widespread terrorist radicalization or recruiting 
occurring in [federal prisons].”187 A special report by the Homeland Security 
Policy Institute at George Washington University and the Critical Incident 
Analysis Group at the University of Virginia found that radicalization 
“remains the exception among prisoners rather than the rule.”188 
In sum, while we should take seriously the problem of prisoner 
radicalization, we should be loath to paint the majority of Muslim inmates 
with the brush of Islamic extremism. 
In any event, before we could conclude that the Muslim prisoner 
disadvantage in religious-liberty litigation is justified by weaker quality on the 
merits, we would have to carefully examine the nature of claims actually 
raised seeking Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation. We would need to 
determine whether the claims as framed in court documents are infected by 
extremism and whether the accommodations requested are excessive by 
comparison. A Muslim prisoner with otherwise extreme religious views who 
seeks basic worship opportunities or asks to avoid pork and receive meals 
containing halal meat presumably ought not be treated any differently by a 
court than a prisoner of moderate Islamic views or a Christian or Jew who 
seeks a place to pray or a religiously mandated diet. 
In our data set, the most common claims Muslim prisoners made were 
simple requests, such as prayer space189 and dietary accommodations.190 
 
 186. OIG REVIEW, supra note 184, at 9. 
 187. Id. at 7. 
 188. GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV., HOMELAND SEC. POLICY INST. & UNIV. OF VA. CRITICAL 
INCIDENT ANALYSIS GRP., OUT OF THE SHADOWS: GETTING AHEAD OF PRISONER RADICALIZATION, 
at iv, 14 (2006) [hereinafter PRISONER RADICALIZATION], available at www.gwumc.edu/hspi/ 
policy/PrisonerRadicalization.pdf. 
 189. See, e.g., Abdul-Matiyn v. Coughlin, 24 F. App’x 97 (2d Cir. 2001); Jones v. Roth, 950 
F. Supp. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Counts v. Newhart, 951 F. Supp. 579 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff’d, 116 
F.3d 1473 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 190. See, e.g., Jackson v. Hill, 128 F. App’x 595 (9th Cir. 2005); McEachin v. McGuinnis, 
357 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004); Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582 (2d Cir. 2003); Williams v. 
Morton, 343 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2003); Davis v. Clinton, 74 F. App’x 452 (6th Cir. 2003); Kind v. 
Frank, 329 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2003); Makin v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 
1999); Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 522 U.S. 801 (1997); Eason v. 
Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322 (5th Cir. 1996); Hudson v. Maloney, 326 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D. Mass. 
2004); Brown v. Johnson, No. 98-CV-6260CJS(F), 2003 WL 360118 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2003); 
Majid v. Wilhelm, 110 F. Supp. 2d 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Muhammad v. Warithu-Deen Umar, 98 
F. Supp. 2d 337 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); Denson v. Marshall, 59 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 1999), 
aff’d, 230 F.3d 1347 (1st Cir. 2000); Abdullah v. Fard, 974 F. Supp. 1112 (N.D. Ohio 1997), 
aff’d, 173 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 1999). While economic challenges in providing halal meats in 
prison locations far from areas with large Muslim American populations could explain the 
reluctance of prison authorities to make such accommodations, those logistical arguments were 
rarely asserted in court. When those arguments were presented, however, administrative or 
economic burdens proved surprisingly successful as defenses to religious-liberty claims by 
prisoners in court, even when used to justify discriminatory treatment of Muslims compared to 
others requesting a restricted-religious diet. See Williams, 343 F.3d at 217–22 (approving denial 
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As Senators Orrin Hatch and Edward Kennedy said in support of the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act191: “It is well known 
that prisoners often file frivolous claims; it is less well known that prison 
officials sometimes impose frivolous or arbitrary rules.”192 
Most importantly, the Muslim disadvantage in raising Religious Free 
Exercise/Accommodation claims in federal court is not confined to the 
prison setting (pun intended). Even when we excluded prisoner cases 
altogether from the analysis and conducted a separate multivariate 
regression analysis of all other case types, Muslims remained statistically 
significant and negatively correlated with the outcome dependent variable—
with the significance of the Muslim variable increasing to the p < .01 or 99% 
probability level. 
In Figure 4, we present a comparison of predicted success rates for 
Muslims as compared to non-Muslims in both Prisoner and Non-Prison 
cases, holding all other explanatory variables constant.193 Muslims are 
predicted to succeed before a federal judge at a rate of 15.5% in Prisoner 
cases and 17.9% in Non-Prison cases.194 By contrast, non-Muslims are 
predicted to succeed before a federal judge at a rate of 44.8% in a Prisoner 
case and 37.3% in a Non-Prison case.195 Thus, a Muslim prisoner raising a 
Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation claim has only about a third the 
chance for success as a non-Muslim prisoner, while Muslims raising claims 
 
of halal meats to hundreds of Muslim prisoners based on security, administrative, and 
budgetary burdens, while noting that there was no evidence that kosher meals in the prison 
included meat); Fard, 974 F. Supp. at 1115 (denying halal meals to Muslim prisoners, despite 
kosher meals being provided to Jewish prisoners because “[t]he number of inmates 
demonstrating a need for such meals is small and [the prison] is able to meet the demand for 
kosher food for those few inmates at reasonable cost from outside suppliers”). 
 191. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 
(2006). 
 192. 146 CONG. REC. 16,698, 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. 
Kennedy). 
 193. In these case-type-differentiated regression analyses, a few claimant religion variables 
were dropped from analysis because they lacked variation due to perfect prediction of failure 
(Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and Christian Variation in Prisoner cases; and Black 
Separatists, Buddhists, and White Separatists in Non-Prison cases). In addition, the Case Type 
control variables were necessarily omitted. Although the number of observations excluded in 
each regression run was small (6 out of 569 observations lost in Prisoner cases and 19 out of 
1062 observations lost in Non-Prison cases), the omission of these and the Case Type control 
variables make these incompletely specified models. Accordingly, these predictions of effect size 
are somewhat less reliable than the overall predictions presented in Figures 2 and 3 in Part 
III.B. 
 194. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate by a Muslim claimant in a 
Prisoner case ranges from 8.4% to 22.5%. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success 
rate by a Muslim claimant in a Non-Prison case ranges from 7.5% to 28.4%. 
 195. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success rate by a non-Muslim claimant in a 
Prisoner case ranges from 37.0% to 52.6%. The 95% confidence interval for predicted success 
rate by a non-Muslim claimant in a Non-Prison case ranges from 34.0% to 40.7%. 
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outside the prison setting succeed at a rate only about half that of non-
Muslim religious-liberty claimants. 
FIGURE 4 
PREDICTED PROBABILITY THAT A CLAIMANT WILL SUCCEED ON A RELIGIOUS FREE 
EXERCISE/ACCOMMODATION CLAIM, BY MUSLIM IDENTITY AND BY TYPE OF CASE  
(PRISONER V. NON-PRISON) 
In sum, Muslims still suffer a significantly and substantially diminished 
success rate in federal court, even setting aside claims made by prisoners and 
focusing instead on challenges to regulations, demands for protection of 
religious expression, objections to zoning laws, allegations of employment 
discrimination by the federal government as an employer, defenses to 
criminal charges, and others. 
4. The “Islam Viewed as Dangerous” Thesis: Perceptions and Realities 
About American Muslims 
The most obvious explanation for the Muslim disadvantage in asserting 
claims in federal court for accommodation of Islamic religious beliefs is, in 
our view, the one most likely to be correct. Beginning with the Islamic 
revolution in Iran and terrorist episodes during the 1970s and 1980s, and 
then accelerating through the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001, 
Islam has been made “a target in the eyes of mainstream America.”196 As 
Professor Richard Schragger writes, “[i]mmediately after 9/11, the idea that 
Islam was a fundamentally violent and depraved religion that needed to be 
 
 196. Barreto & Bozonelos, supra note 128, at 212. 
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opposed by right-thinking Americans took hold, and continues to be 
asserted by relatively mainstream figures.”197 
Pejorative news stories suggesting that Muslims in the West were 
cultural invaders and sought to coercively impose “Sharia law”198 further 
“fueled ‘moral panic.’”199 Sociologist Stanley Cohen, who originated the 
term, defines “moral panic” as when a “condition, episode, person or group 
of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and 
interests [and] its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical 
fashion.”200 
The negative image of Islam and its followers in America, sadly accepted 
by a substantial segment of our society, bears little resemblance to reality. As 
reported by the Pew Research Center in 2007: 
A comprehensive nationwide survey of Muslim Americans finds 
them to be largely assimilated, happy with their lives, and moderate 
with respect to many of the issues that have divided Muslims and 
Westerners around the world. Muslim Americans are a highly 
diverse population, one largely comprised of immigrants. 
Nonetheless, they are decidedly American in their outlook, values, 
and attitudes. Overwhelmingly, they believe that hard work pays off 
in this society. This belief is reflected in Muslim American income 
and education levels, which generally mirror those of the general 
public.201 
Muslims have entered into mainstream America, energetically participating 
in the marketplace and social life. Based on a comprehensive survey of 
mosque leaders, Professor Ihsan Bagby reports the “virtually unanimous view 
(96 percent)” among mosque leaders that Muslims should be “involved in 
 
 197. Richard Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise After Employment Division v. Smith: Same-
Sex Marriage, the “War on Terror,” and Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2009, 2011–12 
(2011). 
 198. See Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, and the First Amendment, 
5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 347–50 (2011) (describing 2010 ballot initiative in Oklahoma to 
ban the use of “Sharia law” in court, to oppose the supposed intent of Muslims to bring all of 
Americans under Sharia law, as a campaign “to translate [private] animus into official form”); 
Joel A. Nichols, Religion, Marriage, and Pluralism, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 967, 967–69, 971–73, 
977–78 (2011) (stating that “Muslims are also on the receiving end of a great deal of cultural 
antipathy,” providing numerous examples, including the anti-Sharia law movement). 
 199. Kutty, supra note 145, at 566–67 (discussing how a proposal in Ontario, Canada for 
Muslims to use arbitration laws to voluntarily resolve family disputes by religious principles was 
misrepresented in the media as an effort to establish “new ‘Shari’a Courts’ with coercive powers 
to force all Muslims to arbitrate using Islamic laws”). 
 200. STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 9 (1980). 
 201. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 1. 
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American society—they do not envision a community isolated from the 
American society.”202 
A larger percentage of Muslims (71% in 2007, 74% in 2011) than the 
general American public (64% in 2007, 62% in 2011) has adopted the 
strong work ethic that is iconic of the “American way”—believing people can 
move ahead through hard work and determination.203 Evidencing their 
educational success, 86% of American Muslims, both men and women, work 
in three fields: engineering and electronics, computer science and data 
processing, and medicine.204 
Muslim American women are especially highly educated when 
compared with other faiths, second only to Jewish women, and Muslim 
Americans have the highest level of gender pay equity.205 About half of 
Muslim Americans report having close friends from outside the Islamic 
faith.206 Overall, more than three-quarters of Muslims in the United States 
report that they are happy or satisfied with their lives.207 A very recent poll 
found that, among all religious groups, Muslim Americans are the most 
optimistic about their future.208 
Attributable in part to their greater social and economic integration—
having achieved income and education levels comparable to those of other 
Americans, unlike the persistent poverty and unemployment experienced by 
Muslim immigrants in Europe209—American Muslims are much more likely 
than their European counterparts to repudiate Islamic extremism.210 Only 
5% have a favorable view of Al Qaeda, and only 1% believes that suicide 
bombings are often justifiable to defend Islam, with only 7% saying they are 
sometimes justifiable.211 To be sure, even a small radical minority is cause for 
concern and appropriate vigilance. But that is true of other demographic 
groups in American society as well. We must remember that the most 
horrific home-grown terrorist attack on the United States was the Oklahoma 
 
 202. Ihsan Bagby, The Mosque and the American Public Square, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE 
AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 323, 325. 
 203. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 2, 30; 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, 
supra note 103, at 40. 
 204. Ba-Yunus & Kone, supra note 102, at 317–18. 
 205. 2009 GALLUP MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 11, 56–57. 
 206. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 2; 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, 
supra note 103, at 35. 
 207. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 29; 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, 
supra note 103, at 37. 
 208. ABU DHABI GALLUP CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: FAITH, FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE 13 
(2011) [hereinafter GALLUP MUSLIMS FUTURE], available at http://www.gallup.com/ 
strategicconsulting/153611/REPORT-Muslim-Americans-Faith-Freedom-Future.aspx. 
 209. See 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 3, 18–19. 
 210. See id. at 53–55. 
 211. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 5, 53–54; 2011 PEW MUSLIM 
AMERICANS, supra note 103, at 65–66. 
A5 - SISKHEISE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2012  12:13 PM 
280 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:231 
City bombing in 1995—perpetrated by a white supremacist.212 Indeed, the 
most recent Gallup poll found that, among all major religious groups in 
America, Muslims are least likely to believe that an attack on civilians could 
ever be justified.213 
Followers of Islam support a stronger role for religious, or at least 
religiously based, moral teachings in public life (59%),214 in which they 
differ not at all from evangelical Christians and conservative Catholics and 
Jews, as well as 37% of the American general public.215 Indeed, a higher 
percentage of Christians (54%) than Muslims (43%) think religious 
institutions should express political views.216 
Just under half of American Muslims say they think of themselves as 
Muslim first and American second, but a similar proportion of Christians 
identify themselves primarily as Christian before American.217 Indeed, a 
devout religious believer will likely regard the precepts of God and the unity 
of God’s children as having a greater call on the believer than the 
ordinances of man and the structures of nationality.218 Christian civil rights 
leader Martin Luther King, Jr. famously wrote in his Letter from Birmingham 
City Jail in 1963 that “one has a moral responsibility to disobey unjust laws” 
that do not square with “the law of God.”219 Former British Lord Chancellor 
Thomas More, who was executed by King Henry VIII in 1535 for refusing to 
take an oath to the King’s supremacy over the church, perished as “the 
King’s good servant, but God’s first.”220 (More was pronounced the patron 
saint of politicians and lawyers by Pope John Paul II in 2000.)221 Thus, giving 
priority of place to one’s faith and religious identity, over ethnic and 
 
 212. See Lois Romano & Tom Kenworthy, McVeigh Guilty on All 11 Counts, WASH. POST (June 
3, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/oklahoma/stories/ 
guilty2.htm (describing Timothy McVeigh’s conviction and adoption of a white supremacist 
novel calling for the violent overthrow of the government as his “political bible”). On the 
McVeigh case generally, see United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(affirming conviction and death sentence for Timothy McVeigh in 1995 bombing of Oklahoma 
City federal building). 
 213. GALLUP MUSLIMS FUTURE, supra note 208, at 6, 31. 
 214. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 7. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 8. 
 217. 2007 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 59, at 31; 2011 PEW MUSLIM AMERICANS, 
supra note 103, at 34. 
 218. See Omar Khalidi, Living as a Muslim in a Pluralistic Society and State: Theory and 
Experience, in MUSLIMS’ PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE, supra note 61, at 38, 65 
(encouraging Muslim parents to “[i]nculcat[e] the idea that Islam is beyond time, space, and 
ethnic and national identities”). 
 219. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail (1963), in THE AMERICAN 
READER 568, 571 (Diane Ravitch ed., 2d ed. 2000). 
 220. PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 394 (1998) (last words before his 
execution (July 6, 1535)). 
 221. GEORGE WEIGEL, WITNESS TO HOPE: THE BIOGRAPHY OF POPE JOHN PAUL II 866 
(Harper Perennial ed. 2005). 
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national allegiances, has a long and honored tradition in Anglo-American 
history. 
Unfortunately, as every scholar, and especially every empirical 
researcher, recognizes, popular public perceptions do not always coincide 
with the reality confirmed by evidence beyond the anecdotal. In 2010, the 
Pew Research Center found that more Americans harbored an unfavorable 
view (38%) of Islam than a favorable one (30%).222 In 2009, a Gallup poll 
found a majority of Americans had either a “not too favorable” or “not 
favorable at all” attitude toward Islam.223 In 2010, the margin between 
Americans who reject and those who accept the proposition that Islam is 
more likely than other religions to encourage violence was only 7% (42% 
reject to 35% accept).224 By the following year, the margin had slipped to 
only two percent (42%–40%).225 In 2004, Cornell University’s Media and 
Society Research Group reported that 44% of Americans believed that, to 
protect against terrorism, the government should “curtail civil liberties for 
Muslim Americans” in the United States.226 Professor Aminah Beverly 
McCloud worries that the tragic events of 9/11 have “hardened further the 
hearts of those who see Islam and Muslims as a threat to the ‘freedoms, 
rights, and peacefulness’ of the United States.”227 
The remaining question and the subject of the next Part of this Article 
is whether the persistent uneasiness of many Americans about Islam and its 
followers has filtered into the attitudes of federal judges and affected rulings 
on religious-liberty claims. If so, as we suggest below, then the country faces 
a new threat to religious liberty. 
V. OF TIDES AND CURRENTS: FEDERAL JUDGES AND ATTITUDES ABOUT ISLAM 
IN AMERICA 
When adherents to Islam turn from ineffective or unraveling 
accommodations in the political realm and assert constitutional or parallel 
statutory claims for the free exercise of their religion, the courts responding 
to those claims are, of course, populated by human beings. The men and 
women who preside over those cases are as human as the rest of us, hardly 
immune from “[t]he great tides and currents which engulf the rest of 
 
 222. Public Remains Conflicted over Islam, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Aug. 24, 2010), http:// 
pewresearch.org/pubs/1706/poll-americans-views-of-muslims-object-to-new-york-islamic-center-
islam-violence. 
 223. THE MUSLIM WEST FACTS PROJECT, RELIGIOUS PERCEPTIONS IN AMERICA: WITH AN IN-
DEPTH ANALYSIS OF U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARD MUSLIMS AND ISLAM 4, 7 (2009), available at 
http://www.gallup.com/strategicconsulting/153434/ENGLISH-First-PDF-Test.aspx. 
 224. Public Remains Conflicted over Islam, supra note 222. 
 225. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 109, at 1. 
 226. Fear Factor: 44 Percent of Americans Queried in Cornell National Poll Favor Curtailing Some 
Liberties for Muslim Americans, CORNELL NEWS (Dec. 17, 2004), http://www.news.cornell.edu/ 
releases/Dec04/Muslim.Poll.bpf.html. 
 227. McCloud, supra note 62, at 83. 
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men.”228 The horrific events of September 11, 2001, the strong emotional 
responses of a shattered nation, and the subsequent social and political 
convulsions, have not passed by the judges, notwithstanding their place in 
the elite sectors of society and their independence from ordinary political 
processes and economic dislocations. Every American from every walk of life 
was profoundly affected by the 9/11 attacks on our nation, which took the 
lives of Americans from every walk of life, not discriminating by socio-
economic status, ideology, race, color, or religion. 
Judges at the higher ranks of the federal judiciary, observe Professors 
Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins, “care more about the views of academics, 
journalists, and other elites than they do about public opinion.”229 The elite 
audiences for federal judges may be liberal on civil liberties,230 and the social 
circles in which federal judges move generally consist of highly educated 
and wealthy people.231 But judges are not hermetically sealed away from the 
fears and fear-generated stereotypes that infect the general public. And 
when those fears are provoked by terrorist attacks that were deliberately 
targeted at prominent places regularly visited by the elites—the centers of 
commerce and government—then the walls may come down. 
Well before 9/11, and with increasing frequency afterward, one need 
have only picked up a newspaper, turned on the television, or listened with 
half-an-ear to informal conversations at a coffee shop or while waiting at the 
airport to have heard admissions of disquiet about our Muslim neighbors or 
negative characterizations about Islam. While most federal judges 
undoubtedly would be among the plurality of Americans answering “no” to 
such polling questions as whether Islam encourages violence more than 
other religions,232 judges still hear those questions being insistently asked. 
And if we hear alarming assertions repeated regularly, we may internalize 
those concepts, leaving us uneasy at a subconscious level. Stereotypes about 
Muslims may have been so powerful as to override the social psychology 
patterns and judicial role attitudes that otherwise would move federal judges 
toward greater tolerance. 
The results of our ongoing study suggest that an uneasiness about 
Muslims in America and disquiet about Islam had filtered into the federal 
judiciary well before 2001, extending back more than a decade before 
Islamic extremist violence erupted on American soil. While 9/11 may not 
 
 228. CARDOZO, supra note 1, at 168. 
 229. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the American 
People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1516 (2010) (writing about Supreme Court Justices); see also 
LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 25 
(2006) (saying, as a matter of social psychology theory, that “[p]eople want to be liked and 
respected by others who are important to them”). 
 230. Baum & Devins, supra note 229, at 1545. 
 231. BAUM, supra note 229, at 89–90. 
 232. See supra notes 222–25 and accompanying text. 
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have initially implanted such attitudes, the attacks on our nation have 
undoubtedly made it harder to remove them, even for people committed to 
equity. Given the strong role that emotion plays in our psychology and 
cognition,233 the national concussion that we collectively suffered from 
witnessing the events of September 11, 2001, has surely left psychological 
scars and cognitive impairments with us all, even if we are not always aware 
of them.234 That deeply emotional national experience undoubtedly has 
infused “implicit beliefs” that affect the way in which we understand the 
world around us.235 Borrowing concepts from social and cognitive 
psychology, we may be able to better explain the Muslim disadvantage in 
religious-liberty cases and further understand the cognitive load on the 
judges who decide their fate. 
In the types of cases that we examine in the present study, the religious 
claimant invariably is challenging government decisions, which in turn are 
often defended by public officers as necessary to law and order. Thus, we 
believe, even more so than in other types of litigation, underlying negative 
impressions about Muslims or Islam are likely to emerge, even if not 
consciously realized by the decider. Indeed, a Religious Free 
Exercise/Accommodation claim, by its nature, highlights the claimant’s 
religious beliefs and practices. Thus, when a religious-liberty claim is 
presented to a federal judge by a follower of Islam, his or her Muslim 
identity is placed front and center, not merely being a secondary attribute of 
the litigant. Stereotypes about Muslims as security risks and Islam as a 
religion of violence are especially likely to be activated in contexts that 
already breed negative stereotypes, such as claims by prisoners—the lion’s 
share of claims by Muslims included in this study.236 
As psychology Professor Seymour Epstein explains, each of us 
“apprehend[s] reality in two fundamentally different ways, one variously 
labeled intuitive, automatic, natural, non-verbal, narrative, and experiential, 
 
 233. See Seymour Epstein, Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory of Personality, in 5 HANDBOOK OF 
PSYCHOLOGY: PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 159, 160–61 (Theodore Millon, Melvin J. 
Lerner & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2003) (describing “the experiential conceptual system”—the 
unconscious side of cognition—as “emotionally driven”). 
 234. See id. at 160 (explaining that the experiential or unconscious system of cognition in 
human beings “adapts by learning from experience rather than by logical inference,” including 
encoding information “particularly [from] events that were experienced as highly emotionally 
arousing”). 
 235. See Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and the Psychodynamic Unconscious, 49 
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 715 (1994) (explaining that “[p]eople have constructs about the self 
and the world” in the “two major systems by which people adapt to the world,” with constructs 
in the rational system being “beliefs” and constructs in the experiential system being “implicit 
beliefs” or “schemata,” which “consist primarily of generalizations derived from emotionally 
significant past experience”). 
 236. See supra notes 174–92 and accompanying text. 
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and the other analytical, deliberative, verbal, and rational.”237 Not only is the 
unconscious, intuitive, or experiential system an elemental part of our 
personality, but we could not function if we had to deliberately and 
purposefully pass every inclination and choice of action across the 
conscious, rational side. Psychology Professor and Nobel Laureate in 
economics Daniel Kahneman describes “System 1” (our intuitive process) as 
“operat[ing] automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense 
of voluntary control,” while “System 2” (our “conscious reasoning self”) gives 
“attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it.”238 As Kahneman 
puts it, “the division of labor between System 1 and System 2 is highly 
efficient: it minimizes effort and optimizes performance.”239 
Despite being an integral and often beneficial side of our personality, 
Epstein warns that the experiential system is “[m]ore crudely differentiated” 
and lends itself to “stereotypical thinking.”240 When we are making decisions 
about particular people, fundamental fairness and respect for human 
dignity demand that we make individual and rational judgments.241 Because 
“[i]mplicit biases function automatically,” observes a group of law and 
psychology scholars in a recent article with Professor Jerry Kang as lead 
author, we must seek to counter harmful subconscious prejudices by 
“engag[ing] in effortful, deliberative processing.”242 
We would be foolish and unjust to indict judges for being human and 
thus having an intuitive or experiential side to their personalities. If we have 
correctly diagnosed an unconscious tendency among federal judges to 
respond negatively to Muslim requests for exemption or accommodation 
from government rules or policies, then we really have done nothing more 
than identify one more dimension of that general attitude among the 
American people. In sum, it is not a problem with judges, but a problem 
with (nearly) all Americans. 
Nonetheless, we properly demand that judges strive for impartiality, 
thus becoming aware of and overcoming stereotypes and biased inferences 
 
 237. Epstein, supra note 235, at 710; see also Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: 
Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449, 1450 (2003) (“The present 
treatment distinguishes two modes of thinking and deciding, which correspond roughly to the 
everyday concepts of reasoning and intuition.”). On dual-process theories of cognition as 
applied to judging, see generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, 
Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 238. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–21 (2011) (adopting terms 
originally proposed by psychologists Keith Stanovich and Richard West). 
 239. Id. at 25. 
 240. Epstein, supra note 235, at 711 tbl.1. 
 241. See Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1277 (2002) (“If our values include fairness and treating people as 
individuals, then anything that increases self-awareness should decrease our application of 
stereotypes.”). 
 242. Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1177 (2012). 
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that could be affecting their decision-making ability at an unconscious level. 
Psychology Professor Albert Bandura emphasizes that “[t]he capability to 
reflect upon oneself and the adequacy of one’s thoughts and actions is . . . 
[an] exclusively human attribute . . . .”243 Professor Gary Blasi writes: 
A general awareness of our frail rationality, however, is not 
sufficient. In order to inhibit judgments and behavior based on 
stereotypes, we must be aware of the specific stereotype at the time it 
is activated. The entire thrust of the research . . . is that stereotype 
activation often takes place at a preconscious or subconscious level. 
Assuming we do have some specific and timely awareness, we must 
also have both the motivation and the ability to control stereotype 
activation and application. Motivation can be supplied by social 
norms or our own moral values and personal will. The ability to 
control these otherwise automatic processes means devoting time 
and cognitive resources to focusing on individuating 
information.244 
Many judges have no doubt conducted such careful self-examinations 
and emphasized conscious cognition in deliberations about religious-liberty 
cases involving Muslims (and other claimants). Not only does a particular 
ruling against a Muslim claimant standing alone fail to show bias, conscious 
or unconscious, but Muslims did not fail on every religious-liberty claim in 
our study (even though Muslims collectively did fail at a disproportionate 
rate). We take this opportunity to remind our readers that “it is not proper 
to assume that a social scientific finding is a good description of all 
individuals studied, much less any particular individual within a study.”245 
Nonetheless, despite our own enormous respect for judges, more than 
one of whom we count as friends, we have no reason to believe that judges as 
a group are exempt from the implicit biases held by the general population. 
For example, an important study by Professors Jeffrey Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Chris Guthrie, and Judge Andrew Wistrich produced results that 
were “both alarming and heartening: (1) Judges hold implicit racial biases. 
(2) These biases can influence their judgment. (3) Judges can, at least in 
 
 243. Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory of Personality, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY 
154, 180 (Lawrence A. Pervin & Oliver P. John eds., 2d ed. 1999). 
 244. Blasi, supra note 241, at 1252–53; see also Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic 
Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 247 (2002) (insisting that 
“highly motivated individuals can modify the automatic operation of stereotypes and 
prejudice”); Patricia G. Devine & Margo J. Monteith, Automaticity and Control in Stereotyping, in 
DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 339, 346 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 
1999) (“First, one must be aware of the potential influence of the stereotype. This condition is 
rather obvious; one cannot counteract the outcome if one is unaware of the need for 
counteraction.”). 
 245. John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender 
Discrimination: The Ascendance of “Social Frameworks,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1715, 1735 n.58 (2008). 
A5 - SISKHEISE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/10/2012  12:13 PM 
286 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:231 
some instances, compensate for their implicit biases.”246 Judicial role 
expectations and a “professional commitment” to racial equality 
“appear[ed] to have limited impact on automatic racial associations” among 
the judges they studied.247 Encouragingly, the researchers found, “when 
judges are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the influence 
of implicit racial biases, and are motivated to suppress that bias, they appear 
able to do so.”248 Along the same lines, we hope our study imparts the need 
for judges to monitor and suppress the influence of negative religious 
stereotypes as well. 
To avoid stereotypic responses, psychology Professors Patricia Devine 
and Margo Monteith maintain that a decision-maker must “tak[e] the more 
effortful and time-consuming route of gathering individual pieces of 
information about the target, rather than relying on activated 
stereotypes.”249 With a “bottom-up model” of judging, instead of resolving a 
dispute by abstract theoretical reasoning that is vulnerable to the influence 
of unconscious attitudes, the judge constructs a decision by assembling the 
facts and evidence that make up the building blocks of an individual case.250 
Fortunately, in 2006—just after the period examined in the present 
study—the Supreme Court clarified religious free-exercise doctrine251 in a 
manner that may motivate federal judges to engage in the kind of “cognitive 
correction”252 that could mitigate the biasing influences of the unconscious 
mind. 
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal,253 the Supreme 
Court unanimously insisted that RFRA254 demands a “focused” and not a 
“categorical approach” when balancing the government’s interest against 
the burden on the claimant’s ability to freely exercise their religion.255 The 
Court pronounced “that the compelling interest test is satisfied through 
application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant 
 
 246. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does 
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1197 (2009). 
 247. Id. at 1222. 
 248. Id. at 1221. 
 249. Devine & Monteith, supra note 244, at 347; see Kang et al., supra note 242, at 1160 
(warning that when judges “lack sufficient individuating information,” they “have no choice but 
to rely more heavily on [their] schemas”). 
 250. See Brandon L. Bartels, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Models of Judicial Reasoning, in THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 41, 48 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010) 
(“The bottom-up model is a data-driven reasoning process whereby the evidence, information, 
facts, and legal considerations objectively guide the decision maker.”). 
 251. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 252. See Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich & Guthrie, supra note 246, at 1223 (noting that, 
when motivated, judges appeared to take steps to compensate for unconscious racial biases). 
 253. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418. 
 254. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006). 
 255. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430. 
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whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.”256 
Accordingly, with respect to a religious sect that makes sacramental use of a 
hallucinogenic substance, the government’s “mere invocation” of a general 
prohibition on non-medical use of narcotics without individualized case-
specific scrutiny was not insufficient.257 
Reexamining this decision from a social-psychology perspective, O 
Centro mandates that judges hearing religious-liberty claims move beyond 
“category-based processes” and instead devote concerted attention to 
“individuating processes” that focus on the claimant’s particular attributes, 
thereby loosening the grip of stereotypes258: First, if the government no 
longer may rest on unexamined generalized policy concerns in defending 
religious-liberty cases—such as health and safety, national security, law and 
order, equality, the war on drugs, or uniform application—then the 
government is less likely to rely on crude categories that implicate 
stereotypes. In any event, because the court must now “look[] beyond 
broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of 
government mandates,”259 the deciding judge is encouraged to abandon 
stereotypical generalizations and engage in a differentiated and 
individualized analysis of each claim. 
Second, by requiring that a court treat each religious-liberty claimant as 
an individual and conduct a focused examination, the O Centro Court 
effectively directs the deciding judge to resist intuitive or stereotypical 
responses to a claimant or claim. In this way, the court instead may better 
appreciate the character of the claimant’s religious practice and the nature 
of the requested accommodation. By undertaking that examination, the 
judge should learn about each claimant’s faith perspective, objectively and 
 
 256. Id. at 430–31; see also Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. REV. 209, 222 (1994) (“It is not enough that the 
government’s regulation or program as a whole serves a compelling interest. Rather, the 
‘application of the burden to the person’ must be the ‘least restrictive means’ of furthering a 
compelling interest.”); Dawinder S. Sidhu, Religious Freedom and Inmate Grooming Standards, 66 
U. MIAMI L. REV. 923, 928 (2012) (arguing that, under current religious-liberty doctrine, 
prison grooming policies cannot be sustained without “a particularized evidentiary basis that 
the specific plaintiffs or inmates in question pose an actual or threatened risk to the state’s 
compelling penological interests”). 
 257. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 432. 
 258. See Susan T. Fiske & Steven L. Neuberg, A Continuum of Impression Formation, from 
Category-Based to Individuating Processes: Influences of Information and Motivation on Attention and 
Interpretation, in 23 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 
1990) (explaining that people first use category-based processes to form impressions of 
another, but turn to attribute-oriented processes given the opportunity and motivation). But see 
Laurie A. Rudman, Peter Glick & Julie E. Phelan, From the Laboratory to the Bench: Gender 
Stereotyping Research in the Courtroom, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE: PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM 83, 85–90 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008) (arguing that use of 
individuating information to contradict stereotypes is difficult and complex). 
 259. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431. 
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rigorously but also sympathetically, thereby substituting new information 
and understanding for implicit beliefs. 
Because the experiential system of our personality is so resilient, a 
decision-maker’s considered and sincere resolution to set aside intuitions 
and stereotypes may fall short.260 A person may be better advised to “improve 
[the experiential system] by providing it with corrective experiences.”261 As 
psychology researcher Seymour Epstein further suggests, because “the 
experiential system learns directly from experience, another procedure is to 
provide real-life corrective experiences [or] to utilize imagery, fantasy, and 
narratives for providing corrective experiences vicariously.”262 Professor 
Kang and associates refer to this “potentially effective strategy” to reduce the 
impact of implicit biases in the courtroom as “expos[ing] ourselves to 
countertypical associations.”263 
By regular exposure to the diversity of the community, including 
different religious communities, judges may gain “real-life corrective 
experiences” to counter any unfortunate prejudices they may harbor against 
Islam or any other religious tradition. Within the courtroom, while the judge 
of course must eschew “imagery” or “fantasy” (which Epstein suggests for 
therapeutic purposes only), the judge should explore the claimant’s religion 
through evidentiary narrative, allowing the judge to gain an appreciation for 
the faith tradition on its own terms, rather than as filtered through the lens 
of media and other portrayals. 
Faithful application of the Supreme Court’s O Centro framework may be 
a step forward in suppressing religious stereotypes and ensuring fair 
evaluation of each religious-liberty claim. By demanding individuated 
analysis, while resisting categorical generalizations, the O Centro decision 
may advance more equitable and properly differentiated treatment of each 
religious claimant, Muslim or otherwise. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Nearly alone among the diverse groups of religious claimants included 
in our study of Religious Free Exercise/Accommodation claims in the lower 
federal courts from 1996 to 2005, Muslims were significantly and powerfully 
associated with a negative outcome. By comparison, claimants from other 
religious communities were nearly twice as likely to prevail as Muslims, even 
after controlling for other possible influences. Our findings were stronger 
and revealed the greatest disparities when examining rulings by the judges 
of the federal courts of appeals. 
 
 260. Epstein, supra note 233, at 166 (“[G]iven the intrinsically compelling nature of 
experiential processing and its highly adaptive value in most situations in everyday life, such 
resilience is to be expected.”). 
 261. Id. at 161. 
 262. Id. at 165. 
 263. Kang et al., supra note 242, at 1169. 
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“Islam,” says Professor Richard Schragger, “is testing the polity’s 
commitment to religious tolerance.”264 We would add that it also appears to 
be testing the judiciary’s commitment to the impartial adjudication of claims 
of religious liberty among the diverse faith communities that bring 
constitutional and statutory religious-liberty claims in the federal courts. 
Schragger further observes that, while the reaction to the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 has not yet been translated into the law, “it is just a matter of time 
before the politics of 9/11 comes to the doctrinal fore in the Religion 
Clauses.”265 Based on our study, public uneasiness with Muslims has long 
been felt concretely in the actual outcomes of religious-liberty cases, if not 
yet expressly articulated in the doctrine. 
Each generation of Americans is called upon to renew the promise of 
religious liberty in the face of new political and cultural threats. More than a 
half century ago, the public demand for fealty to America in the face of 
external and internal threats of totalitarian ideologies imposed itself on 
religious communities who refused to engage in certain public displays of 
loyalty. Although initially sacrificing religious conscience to nationalism, the 
Supreme Court reversed course and eventually upheld the right of the 
children of Jehovah’s Witnesses not to salute the flag in public schools.266 
During the 1970s and 1980s, the War on Drugs was extended to 
interrupt ceremonial use of sacred substances, when the Supreme Court 
held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit enforcement of Oregon 
drug laws against sacramental use of peyote by Native Americans.267 Once 
again, a course correction came with the intervention of Congress in 
enacting RFRA268 generally, and then specifically extending permission for 
ceremonial use of peyote to all members of recognized Indian tribes.269 
Subsequently, based on RFRA, the Supreme Court held unanimously that, 
when a religious sect makes sacramental use of a hallucinogenic substance, 
“mere invocation” by the government of a general prohibition on non-
medical use of narcotics is insufficient to demonstrate a compelling 
governmental interest to override the individual’s sincere exercise of 
religion.270 
More recently, the movement for equality has led to an expansion of 
anti-discrimination laws to cover new categories of protected persons, to 
include new sectors of society (employment, education, housing, services), and 
to apply to new entities, sometimes including religiously affiliated associations. 
 
 264. Schragger, supra note 197, at 2010. 
 265. Id. at 2014. 
 266. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 267. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990). 
 268. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2006). 
 269. Id. § 1996a(b)(1). 
 270. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 432 
(2006). 
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When, for example, traditionalist religious associations seek exemption from 
laws that require provision of birth control coverage to all employees271 or 
that preclude discrimination in employment and services on the basis of 
sexual orientation,272 these religious groups run hard against the grain of 
mainstream secular society in certain regions of the country or 
municipalities.273 Although the extended application of the constitutional 
ministerial exception to anti-discrimination laws appears to have somewhat 
ameliorated the impact on religious communities,274 this cultural conflict 
between liberal secularists and laws and traditionalist religious groups and 
persons may emerge again in religious-liberty jurisprudence. 
And now, we find that the post-9/11 backlash against Muslims and 
longstanding societal antipathy toward or fear of Islam poses a growing 
threat to religious liberty in the United States. Professor Noah Feldman 
likens the anti-Muslim bias that has erupted over the past couple of years to 
the animosity directed at Jehovah’s Witnesses in the 1940s.275 Once again, 
we find the religious consciences of a people of faith being sacrificed to 
shifting political and cultural forces. American history teaches us that the 
free exercise of religion may too easily be submerged beneath platitudes 
about “law and order,” “national security,” or “the equal opportunity 
 
 271. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004) 
(denying religious exemption to Catholic Charities from state statute requiring employers to 
provide contraceptive coverage to employees). See generally Alan Brownstein, Taking Free Exercise 
Rights Seriously, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 55, 101 (2006) (arguing that “society benefits from the 
existence and checking function of independent sources of moral authority” and, for that 
reason, “we should protect [Catholic Charities’] ability to be faithful to that vision against state 
regulations that undermine its moral integrity—unless some sufficiently important state interest 
is at stake that cannot be adequately furthered through some other means”); Susan J. Stabile, 
When Conscience Clashes with State Law & Policy: Catholic Institutions, 46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 137, 
150 (2007) (“A religious institution cannot communicate an effective message that conduct is 
sinful at the same time that it pays for that conduct to occur.” (quoting Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 14, Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. California, 543 U.S. 816 (2004) (No. 
03-1618), 2004 WL 1243136, at *14)). 
 272. Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty Claims Have in Common, 5 
NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 206 (2010) (“Catholic Charities of Boston, a large provider of social 
services in Massachusetts, was told it would be barred from performing adoptions in the state 
unless it agreed to place children in same-sex households.”); Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and 
the Free Exercise of Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 414–15 (2011) (suggesting that a 
major current threat to religious liberty flows from perceptions by the gay rights movement that 
“traditional religion [is] their principal enemy” and further criticizing the failure of both gay 
rights activists and religious traditionalists to find compromise); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. 
Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 302 (2010) 
(referring to “the now-famous withdrawal of adoption services by Catholic Charities of Boston, a 
case that sadly illustrates the social costs that may be incurred when religious charities are faced 
with nondiscrimination requirements in tension with faith principles” (footnote omitted)). 
 273. See Sisk, supra note 17, at 1049–50. 
 274. See supra Part IV.B.2.c. 
 275. Noah Feldman, Islamic Constitutionalism in Context: A Typology and a Warning, 7 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 436, 437–38 (2010). 
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society.” Subordination of religious conscience to the dictates of the state, 
the preferences of the mainstream culture, or the stereotypes fostered by 
fear, in the name of some policy goal, societal convenience, or comfort to 
the fearful, is the antithesis of religious liberty. 
We are all living in the shadow of 9/11—but that shadow appears to be 
longer and darker for Muslim Americans. By shining the light on the costs to 
religious liberty, we hope that shadow may begin to dissipate. 
 
